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ABSTRACT 
  Corporations insure against liability in shareholder lawsuits by 
buying tiered coverage from multiple insurers who each cover a 
distinct segment of the potential damages range. Rather than 
negotiating to settle individually with the plaintiff, the insurers seek to 
reach a single, collectively binding settlement agreement. This 
combination of segmented coverage and collective settlements 
produces a conflict of interests: the corporation’s managers and some 
insurers are better off if the case settles pre-trial for the expected 
damages, while other insurers are better off going to trial. To force 
reluctant insurers to settle, courts have created a duty that can require 
an insurer to pay its policy amount when the plaintiff makes a 
settlement demand that exceeds that amount and another insurer or 
the corporation is willing to pay the rest. This “duty to contribute” 
biases negotiations toward settlements that overcompensate plaintiffs, 
thereby encouraging lawsuits of doubtful merit. The conflict of 
interests in settlement negotiations could be eliminated by allowing 
defense-side parties (defendants and their liability insurers) to settle 
separately their respective segments of the damages range. But this 
“segmented” approach to settlements is contrary to the private 
interests of managers because it eliminates the justification for the 
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duty to contribute. That duty forces insurers to pay for settlements that 
they think are excessive or contractually uninsurable, thereby 
shielding corporate earnings reports—and managers’ incentive-based 
pay—from the costs of shareholder lawsuits resulting from the 
managers’ conduct. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Liability insurance makes defendants overeager to settle risky 
lawsuits. If a lawsuit goes to trial, the damages award could be greater 
than the coverage limit on the defendant’s liability policy, forcing the 
defendant to pay the excess. But the plaintiff will usually be willing to 
settle before trial for a discounted amount that factors in the 
possibility of a verdict for the defendant. Settling pre-trial thus 
compresses the liability burden, increasing the proportion that falls 
within the insurance policy limit and hence is borne by the insurer. 
This opportunity to concentrate liability on the insurer can make the 
defendant better off settling before trial even when the plaintiff’s 
settlement demand exceeds the expected (that is, risk-discounted) 
damages. And the insurer has the opposite bias: it often is better off 
going to trial, even when the plaintiff is willing to settle for less than 
the expected damages. 
The same dynamic arises in the more complex situation in which 
the defendant has multiple liability insurers, as is typical in 
shareholder lawsuits against corporate managers for securities fraud 
and breaches of fiduciary duties. To cover the costs of such suits, most 
public corporations purchase not just one directors-and-officers 
(D&O) liability insurance policy, but rather a stack of them, forming 
a so-called insurance “tower.”  The tower’s ground floor is occupied 
by a “primary” insurer that bears the initial liability in a lawsuit up to 
its policy limit. Upper floors are occupied by a series of “excess” 
insurers, each of whose liability begins at the limit of the policy 
immediately below it in the tower. As liability mounts, the policies 
are exhausted in succession. When a lawsuit’s trial outcome is 
uncertain, the primary insurer is biased toward trial, the insured 
defendants are biased toward settling before trial, and the excess 
insurers divide in their biases based on where the expected damages 
fall within the tower. 
To encourage settlements by insurers that are structurally biased 
toward trial, courts have read two duties into liability insurance 
contracts. The first duty requires an insurer to settle before trial when 
it can do so for a reasonable amount within its policy limit. This “duty 
to settle” has been thoroughly analyzed by academic commentators. 
The second duty requires an insurer to contribute its policy amount to 
a settlement when the plaintiff’s settlement demand is above the 
insurer’s policy limit but another defense-side party—that is, another 
insurer or the defendant—is willing to pay the above-limit portion. 
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This second duty has been ignored by commentators, and indeed 
there is no conventional name for it: this Article calls it the “duty to 
contribute.”  This duty distorts negotiations by permitting 
“cramdown” settlements in which a party on an upper floor of an 
insurance tower settles with the plaintiff and then shifts most of the 
liability to the insurers below. Because cramdown settlements 
concentrate liability on non-consenting third parties, they will tend to 
overcompensate plaintiffs, the predictable consequence of a judge-
made duty that favors the parties in settlement negotiations who are 
overeager to settle. 
A more efficient way to resolve the conflict of interests in 
settlement negotiations would be to eliminate the conflict at its 
source. Courts and commentators have treated the conflict as an 
inevitable byproduct of insurance policy limits. But the conflict is not 
inevitable; rather, it arises only when a settlement takes the form of a 
collective resolution that binds all defense-side parties. The 
presumption that settlements must be collective is so widespread that 
it has gone essentially unnoticed. Yet the presumption is worth 
questioning, as it is the reason that settlement causes some defense-
side parties to pay more, and others to pay less, than their expected 
liability at trial. This divergence between trial burdens and settlement 
burdens encourages strategic behavior, as it enables defense-side 
parties to shift liability onto each other when deciding whether to 
accept or reject a settlement offer. 
This conflict of interests in settlement negotiations would be 
eliminated if each defense-side party were allowed to settle separately 
its respective slice of the damages range. Under this “segmented” 
approach to settlements, trial would occur unless all slices settled, and 
the plaintiff would collect at trial only those awarded damages (if 
any) that fell within the unsettled slices. Segmenting settlements in 
this way would eliminate the mismatch between trial liability and 
settlement liability that encourages strategic behavior. Unlike the 
judge-made duties to settle and contribute, this segmented approach 
would address both sides of the conflict: lower-level insurers would 
no longer be biased against settling, and upper-level insurers and 
defendants would no longer be biased in favor of settling. With these 
biases eliminated, the duties to settle and contribute could be 
abandoned as obsolete. And because the duty to contribute produces 
cramdown settlements, its elimination would remove the plaintiff-
overcompensation hazard.  
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If segmented settlements really would be more efficient, why 
have they not been adopted already?  Outside the context of 
shareholder litigation, the most likely obstacle to the segmented 
approach is liability insurers’ traditional “duty to defend.”  For 
example, automobile and homeowners liability policies state that the 
insurer, in addition to covering the policyholder’s liability in a lawsuit, 
will defend the policyholder through trial. Courts might deem an 
insurer to have breached its duty to defend if it settled out of a lawsuit 
without obtaining a complete release for the policyholder as well. 
D&O policies, by contrast, cover corporate managers who 
typically disclaim the insurer’s duty to defend and insist on controlling 
their own defenses. Therefore, in shareholder lawsuits the most likely 
explanation for the persistence of collective settlements is not the 
duty to defend, but rather the managers’ private interests. Managers 
benefit from the collective approach because it provides a 
justification for the duty to contribute, which can be used to 
overcome insurer resistance to settlement. Yet structural bias caused 
by the collective settlements approach is not the only reason that 
insurers might resist settling. They also might resist because they 
think that the plaintiff is demanding more than the lawsuit is worth, 
or that coverage is likely to be excused at trial by a finding that the 
defendants deliberately engaged in misconduct. There is no public-
policy reason to force insurers to settle when their resistance is based 
on these alternative grounds. But the duty to contribute does not 
discriminate, as it forces insurers to settle regardless of their reasons 
for rejecting a plaintiff’s settlement demand. 
Under the segmented approach to settlements, there would be 
no mechanism to force settlements by insurers that believe that the 
plaintiff is overreaching or that a coverage exclusion is likely. For this 
reason, the segmented approach would cause the proportion of 
settlements paid by D&O insurers to fall. The additional liability 
would be borne not by the managers who defend such suits, but 
rather by their corporations, which invariably agree to indemnify 
managers for liability that they incur on the job. But managers would 
still be averse to the change, because insurance coverage prevents a 
large settlement payment from causing a drop in the corporation’s 
reported earnings that could draw unfavorable investor attention and 
reduce managers’ performance-based pay. In this way, insurance 
shields managers who are sued by reducing the volatility of their 
corporation’s reported earnings. 
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Although insurance coverage for settlements benefits corporate 
managers, it imposes a host of costs on shareholders. First, by 
camouflaging the costs of shareholder lawsuits, insurance reduces the 
usefulness of a firm’s reported earnings as a measure of the 
contribution of that firm’s managers to diversified shareholder 
wealth. Second, by encouraging plaintiff overcompensation, the duty 
to contribute gives plaintiffs’ attorneys an incentive to file lawsuits of 
doubtful merit. Third, both the duty to contribute and the duty to 
settle require potentially expensive follow-up lawsuits over whether 
the duties have been breached. Fourth, cramdown settlements 
discourage insurer specialization by concentrating liability for both 
low-risk and high-risk lawsuits on primary insurers. And fifth, 
collective settlements lead to overspending on defense attorneys, as 
D&O policies combine coverage for litigation expenses with coverage 
for liability to discourage insurers from rejecting reasonable 
settlement offers. Each of the last four costs drives up D&O 
insurance premiums, which shareholders ultimately pay. 
Courts seem unaware that reading a duty to contribute into 
D&O policies advances managers’ interests at the expense of 
shareholders. Judicial opinions cite the bias of primary insurers 
against settling but do not mention the countervailing bias that makes 
defendants and some excess insurers overeager to settle. Courts could 
increase social wealth by being much leerier of the duty to contribute 
in shareholder lawsuits. Given that defendants in such cases are 
sophisticated enough to insist on running their own defenses and 
negotiating directly with plaintiffs to settle, the justification for the 
duty to contribute does not apply. And without this mechanism for 
camouflaging the costs of shareholder lawsuits, managers would be 
less reluctant to adopt an alternative settlements approach that would 
increase shareholder profits. 
The rest of this Article has four parts. Part I explains the conflict 
of interests that occurs in settlement negotiations when settlements 
are collective, and it describes the various legal devices—including 
the duty to contribute—that have been developed to overcome it. 
Part II describes the social costs of these various conflict-control 
devices.  Part III explains how the defense-side conflict of interests 
that courts and commentators attribute to policy limits would 
disappear if settlements were segmented rather than collective. Part 
IV describes why, despite the efficiencies of the segmented approach, 
corporate managers probably prefer the status quo. A brief 
conclusion and an appendix follow. 
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I. STRUCTURAL CONFLICT WHEN SETTLEMENTS ARE COLLECTIVE 
The conflict of interests among liability insurers and defendants 
in settlement negotiations is caused by the interaction of two factors: 
policy limits, which serve valuable economic functions, and the 
collective approach to settlements, which often does not. Several legal 
devices have been developed to manage this conflict, but these 
presuppose—and indeed tend to reinforce—the collective approach, 
thereby failing to correct the problem at its source. 
The conflict of interests is perhaps most conspicuous in the 
context of D&O insurance, which protects public corporations and 
their mangers against the most significant source of civil liability they 
face: shareholder litigation. For this reason, this Part begins by 
describing the structure of D&O coverage purchased by public firms. 
Many of the qualitative observations about D&O insurance are, 
however, also true of other important types of commercial liability 
coverage. 
A. Liability and Insurance in Shareholder Litigation 
As Professors Thomas Baker and Sean Griffith describe in an 
important recent book on shareholder litigation, the most important 
source of civil liability for American public corporations is the 
shareholder class action alleging fraud on the securities markets.1 
These lawsuits, the majority of which are brought under Rule 10b-52 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,3 can be highly lucrative for 
plaintiffs and their attorneys.4 Between 2003 and 2008, the average 
settlement payout in 10b-5 class actions was $45 million.5 And a 
handful of cases are worth much more: a case against McKesson 
HBOC settled in 2008 for $1.1 billion.6 By comparison, the average 
profits of a Fortune 500 company between 2003 and 2008 were $256 
 
 1. TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW 
LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 21 (2010). 
 2. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).  
 3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 4. Sixty-six percent of securities class actions brought in 2010 alleged violations of Rule 
10b-5. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2010 YEAR IN REVIEW 
31 (2011), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/securities-filings-2010-year-in-review. 
 5. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 22. 
 6. Id. at 23. 
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million per quarter.7 Thus, the average settlement in this period 
would have reduced the average Fortune 500 corporation’s earnings 
by 18 percent in the quarter in which it was reported—that is, if the 
settlement were not covered by insurance.8 
Because of the role that managers play in preparing and 
reviewing corporate financial reports, virtually all 10b-5 actions name 
at least one corporate manager as a defendant.9 As a practical matter, 
however, the managers rarely bear personal liability in securities class 
actions.10 One important reason for the managers’ de facto immunity 
is that almost all public corporations agree to indemnify their 
managers for liability that they incur on the job.11 To be sure, general 
incorporation statutes forbid indemnification when the corporate 
agent is shown to have acted in bad faith or with wrongful intent.12 
But these indemnification disqualifiers are almost never established, 
as essentially all 10b-5 claims are either dismissed or settled before 
trial,13 and the plaintiffs’ attorneys have no financial incentive to insist 
that the defendants admit wrongdoing in the settlement agreement. 
Indeed, the incentives go the other way: the corporation usually has 
much deeper pockets than its managers, giving the managers and the 
 
 7. Earnings figures for the five hundred largest U.S. corporations by revenues (the 
“Fortune 500”) are published by Fortune and are available at Fortune 500, CNNMONEY, 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/full (last visited Sept. 14, 2012).  
 8. This figure actually understates the percentage because the settlement amount is for all 
securities actions while the earnings figure is only for Fortune 500 companies, which due to their 
size will tend to have higher average liability.  
 9. See Michael Klausner & Jason Hegland, How Protective Is D&O Insurance in Securities 
Class Actions?—Part I, PROF. LIABILITY UNDERWRITING SOC’Y J. REPRINT, Feb. 2010, at 1, 2 
(finding that 99 percent of securities class-action complaints name the company’s CEO, and 80 
percent name the CFO). 
 10. See id. at 3 (reporting that corporate officers pay into less than 5 percent of securities 
class action settlements and that outside directors pay into less than 1 percent). 
 11. See id. (“[T]he combination of D&O insurance, indemnification, and the ability of the 
corporation to pay whatever portion of the settlement the insurer does not pay, provides 
substantial protection for officers and directors.”); see also David B. Schulz, Indemnification of 
Directors and Officers Against Liabilities Imposed Under Federal Securities Laws, 78 MARQ. L. 
REV. 1043, 1045 (1995) (“[I]ndemnification [of directors and officers] is generally provided for 
in a corporation’s bylaws or through separate indemnity agreements between the corporation 
and its managers.”).  
 12. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2012); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.51(a)(1) 
(1984 & Supp. 1988/89); see also Stockman v. Heartland Indus. Partners, L.P., No. 4227-VCS, 
2009 WL 2096213, at *10 (Del. Ch. July 14, 2009) (discussing the function of the indemnification 
exclusions under the Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, ch. 1 (2012)); 
VonFeldt v. Stifel Fin. Corp., No. Civ.A. 15688, 1999 WL 413393, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 11, 1999) 
(same). 
 13. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 22. 
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plaintiffs’ attorneys a common interest in ensuring that 
indemnification by the corporation remains available.14 
To cover the costs of securities actions, virtually all public 
corporations purchase D&O insurance.15 Besides covering the 
managers for their personal liability, the typical D&O policy covers 
the corporation itself, both for its indemnification obligations to its 
agents and for any vicarious liability it incurs under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior.16 And, in addition to providing liability 
coverage—that is, coverage for amounts paid to plaintiffs in 
settlements or judgments—D&O policies provide defense coverage—
that is, coverage for defense attorneys and for other litigation 
expenses.17 
D&O insurance is expensive in nominal terms. In 2008, public 
companies with market capitalizations of at least $10 billion paid an 
average of $2.2 million in D&O insurance premiums.18 In relative 
terms, however, this was a small expense—less than 1 percent of these 
companies’ average annual profits.19 And the companies seem to have 
gotten a good deal of coverage for their money. A recent study of 
securities class-action settlements found that D&O insurers paid for 
the full settlement in 53 percent of cases, and they paid a portion—
usually a large portion—of the settlement in 35 percent more.20 
Because directors and officers themselves rarely pay anything in such 
cases, the amounts not covered by the insurers were paid almost 
entirely by the corporations directly. 
Besides covering liability in securities actions, D&O insurance 
covers the costs of a second type of shareholder lawsuit: the 
derivative suit.21 Like securities class actions, most derivative suits are 
 
 14. See Klausner & Hegland, supra note 9, at 3 (“Because securities class actions are 
settled with defendants denying all wrongdoing, there is no way to know whether actual 
misconduct occurred.”). 
 15. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 44. 
 16. In the language of D&O insurance, insurance for the corporation’s indemnification 
obligations is “Side B” coverage, and insurance for the corporation’s direct litigation liability is 
“Side C” coverage. “Side A” coverage is for the managers’ personal liability. Id. at 46–48. 
 17. Id. at 45. 
 18. TOWERS WATSON, DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY: 2008 SURVEY OF 
INSURANCE PURCHASING TRENDS 29 fig.47 (2010), available at http://www.towerswatson.com/
assets/pdf/2791/2791.pdf. 
 19. In 2008, the average annual earnings for all Fortune 500 companies, many of which had 
market capitalizations of less than $10 billion, was $1.3 billion. Fortune 500, supra note 7.  
 20. Klausner & Hegland, supra note 9, at 1.  
 21. Id.  
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brought by shareholders against corporate managers. The main 
difference is that a derivative suit is brought on behalf of the 
corporation, meaning that the corporation rather than its 
shareholders recovers any judgment or settlement payment.22 General 
incorporation statutes prohibit corporations from indemnifying 
managers for personal liability in derivative suits, which makes sense 
given that otherwise the money flow would be circular, with the 
corporation paying for its own recovery.23 But corporations can—and 
almost always do—buy D&O insurance for their managers that 
covers their personal liability in derivative litigation.24 In this way, 
corporations fund their own derivative-suit recoveries ex ante 
(through D&O insurance premiums) even though they are prohibited 
from doing so ex post (by reimbursing the defendants for the 
judgment or settlement).25 
D&O policies always specify that coverage is unavailable if the 
defendants are found to have engaged in deliberate fraud or to have 
enriched themselves at the expense of the corporation.26 Like the 
statutory indemnification disqualifiers, these coverage exclusions 
encourage managers to settle before trial to avoid an adverse finding 
by a judge or jury that could leave them responsible for their own 
legal bills. 
Even though most D&O policies cover defense costs, the 
corporate managers rather than the insurers control the defenses of 
shareholder lawsuits.27 In this way, D&O policies are different from, 
 
 22. WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTS 
AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 364 (3d ed. 2009). 
 23. In derivative litigation, corporations can indemnify their managers for legal expenses 
such as attorneys’ fees, but not for judgments or amounts paid in settlement. Compare DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2012) (permitting indemnification in direct suits against corporate 
agents for “expenses (including attorneys’ fees), judgments, fines, and amounts paid in 
settlement”), and MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.51(a) (1985 & Supp. 1988/99) (permitting 
indemnification of directors against “liability incurred in the proceeding[s]”), with DEL. tit. 8, § 
145(b) (permitting indemnification in derivative suits only for “expenses (including attorneys’ 
fees)”), and MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.51(d)(1) (prohibiting indemnification in derivative 
suits except for “reasonable expenses”).  
 24. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (authorizing D&O insurance); MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT § 8.57 (1985 & Supp. 2000/01/02) (same); BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 57 
(noting that the “vast majority” of public corporations buy both individual coverage for 
directors and officers and entity-level coverage for the corporation).  
 25. In addition, the plaintiffs’ attorneys in a derivative suit can recover their fees directly 
from the corporation. E.g., Fletcher v. A.J. Indus., Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 146, 149–54 (Ct. App. 
1968). 
 26. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 49. 
 27. Id. at 130. 
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for example, automobile and homeowners liability policies, which 
assign the insurer both the right and the duty to run the defense.28 
One potential reason for this difference is that insurers may be more 
likely to assert coverage defenses for intentional misconduct in the 
D&O context, creating a conflict of interests if the insurers were also 
running the defenses of the lawsuits. Other reasons that corporate 
managers would rather run their own defenses in shareholder lawsuits 
are that the managers typically have their own preferred lawyers, and 
that a public trial could impose reputational costs that, unlike 
monetary liability, cannot be shifted to the insurer. 
The managers’ right to run their own defenses entails a right to 
negotiate directly with plaintiffs to settle. D&O policies provide, 
however, that the insurer must consent to a settlement agreement to 
be bound by it.29 Such provisions are strictly enforced, with courts 
holding that policyholders forfeit coverage if they settle without first 
seeking the insurer’s permission.30 This does not mean, however, that 
the insurer has an absolute veto right, as the insurer can be held liable 
for rejecting a settlement offer that a court later decides was 
reasonable.31 
As with other types of liability insurance, D&O policies always 
come with coverage caps, known as policy amounts or limits.32 Policy 
limits make liability insurance marketable, as a policyholder with 
finite wealth will be unwilling or unable to buy infinite wealth 
protection.33 And policy limits also protect insurers against losses they 
cannot bear in a cost-effective manner. Thus, insurance creates 
economic value by enabling the risk-averse policyholder to incur a 
certain cost (the insurance premium) in exchange for protection 
 
 28. Id. at 132. 
 29. Id. 
 30. E.g., Fed. Ins. Co. v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 522 F.3d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 2008) (“By 
cutting Federal Insurance out of the process, Arthur Andersen gave up any claim to 
indemnity . . . .”); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bear Stearns Cos., 884 N.E.2d 1044, 1047–48 (N.Y. 2008) 
(describing how Bear Stearns waived an indemnification clause by settling with the SEC without 
Vigilant’s permission).  
 31. See infra Part I.C.  
 32. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 79. 
 33. Wealthy people will tend to buy more insurance coverage both because they can afford 
more and because they have more to lose from an adverse verdict. See Alan O. Sykes, Judicial 
Limitations on the Discretion of Liability Insurers To Settle or Litigate: An Economic Critique, 
72 TEX. L. REV. 1345, 1361 (1994) (noting that liability policies have limits because “most 
insureds have assets considerably less than the largest possible liability judgment they might 
incur”). 
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against the risk of a much larger, uncertain loss. The insurer, in turn, 
pools this risk with uncorrelated risks from other policies that it sells, 
thereby building a diversified portfolio of contingent liabilities whose 
overall performance is predictable.34 But an insurer may be unable to 
diversify against the risk of an especially large loss on a particular 
policy and hence may use a policy limit to exclude the risk from its 
liability portfolio. 
A characteristic feature of the D&O insurance market is that 
most public corporations do not buy all of their coverage from a 
single insurer. Rather, they buy tiered coverage from several insurers, 
constructing what is called an insurance “tower.”35 The tower’s 
ground floor is occupied by the primary insurer, which bears the 
initial costs of a lawsuit up to the primary policy limit. Above the 
primary insurer is a first-layer excess insurer, which provides coverage 
for losses greater than a specified amount, known as the 
“attachment” point.36 The attachment point typically equals the policy 
limit of the primary policy, making coverage continuous.37 Additional 
layers of excess insurance can be stacked atop the first, creating a 
column of policies that are exhausted in succession as the costs of a 
lawsuit mount. Sitting atop the tower are the defendants themselves, 
who bear any residual liability after all policies have been exhausted.38 
Towers with numerous stories are the norm: in 2008, public 
companies with market capitalizations of at least $10 billion owned an 
average of seven full layers of D&O coverage.39 
Why do corporations erect multi-insurer towers when they 
seemingly could save on transaction costs by consolidating coverage 
in a single policy? One commonly cited explanation for D&O towers 
is that corporate managers want more liability coverage than any 
 
 34. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 131 (8th ed. 2011).  
 35. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 53. 
 36. Id. at 79. 
 37. See, e.g., Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., No. 06C4554, 2010 
WL 2542191, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 2010) (describing a five-policy tower in which each excess 
policy’s attachment point was the limit of the subsituated policy in the tower). 
 38. The defendants also have windows of exposure on lower levels if the policies have 
deductibles. 
 39. According to survey data from Towers Watson, a risk-management consultancy, large-
cap companies had an average of 5.7 full excess policies, or 6.7 full policies when the primary 
policy is included. Interestingly, the survey also found that 80 percent of those companies had 
an additional, Side A-only policy that attached at the top of the stack of full policies. See 
TOWERS WATSON, supra note 18, at 16 fig.21, 18 fig.22. As noted supra, note 16, Side A policies 
cover directors and officers directly for any personal liability they incur.  
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individual insurer is willing to sell.40 Thus, by covering only a portion 
of a company’s potential liability, an insurer avoids the risk of a large 
loss that the insurer cannot easily hedge through diversification. In 
this way, towers are a substitute for reinsurance, an arrangement in 
which an insurer sells a policyholder the desired amount of coverage 
but then purchases from a “reinsurer” its own coverage for some or 
all of its liability on the primary policy.41 The reinsurer is comparable 
to an excess insurer, as it accepts the risk of losses beyond those that 
the primary insurer is willing to bear. The converse explanation for 
insurance towers is that the policyholders want to diversify their 
coverage to protect themselves against the risk that an insurer will 
fail. Evidence for this explanation is the fact that corporate managers 
who are responsible for choosing their companies’ D&O insurers 
rank “financial strength” among their most important selection 
criteria.42 
Starting in Part II, this Article advances two additional 
explanations for D&O towers—one benign, the other worrisome. The 
benign explanation is that towers permit insurers to specialize by 
focusing their coverage on discrete aspects of litigation risk. 
Specialization in this form could create social wealth by enabling 
insurers to reduce their operating costs, a benefit that would translate 
into lower premiums. 
The second, and more troublesome, explanation for insurance 
towers this Article proposes is that towers create settlement conflicts 
among insurers that serve the interests of corporate managers. Due to 
the settlement obligations that courts place on liability insurers, these 
conflicts increase the likelihood that the settlement of a shareholder 
lawsuit will be paid by the defendant corporation’s D&O insurers 
rather than by the corporation itself. Shifting liability for settlements 
to insurers reduces the earnings volatility of those corporations whose 
managers are sued. In this way, insurance towers camouflage the costs 
of shareholder lawsuits resulting from managers’ conduct in office, 
costs that shareholders ultimately bear. While this result is good for 
 
 40. E.g., BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 53. 
 41. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 1.3(b)(2) 
(1988) (“Reinsurance allows an insurer to secure adequate risk distribution by transferring part 
of the risk to another insurer or group of insurers.”).  
 42. TOWERS WATSON, DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY OF 
RESULTS 26 fig.46 (2011), available at http://www.towerswatson.com/assets/pdf/3790/DandO-
Survey_2011.pdf. 
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the corporation’s managers, it harms diversified shareholders by 
diminishing the value of a firm’s reported earnings as an indicator of 
the amount of shareholder wealth created by that firm’s management 
team. The next section lays a foundation for the discussion of these 
additional functions of insurance towers by describing how conflicts 
of interests among defense-side parties arise when settlements are 
collective. 
B. The Settlement-Trial Liability Gap 
It is widely recognized among courts and commentators that 
policy limits introduce a conflict of interests in settlement 
negotiations.43 What these observers have not recognized is that 
policy limits alone are not sufficient to produce this conflict. The 
other necessary element is a presumption that any settlement will be 
a collective resolution that binds all defense-side parties. When the 
trial outcome is uncertain, the collective approach to settlements 
drives a gap between the distribution of the settlement burden and 
the distribution of the expected trial liability, biasing some defense-
side parties in favor of settling and others against it. 
The collective approach to settlements creates a conflict of 
interests whenever the trial outcome is uncertain and the potential 
damages—that is, the damages the plaintiff will win if he prevails at 
trial—exceed the limit of the defendant’s primary liability policy. As 
an illustration, consider a hypothetical lawsuit against an insured 
 
 43. See, e.g., Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 511, 518–19 (Ct. App. 1973) 
(describing how a policy limit can cause the interests of the “assured and carrier” to diverge); 
see also Schwartz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 539 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Merritt, 110 
Cal. Rptr. at 518–19); Robert E. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 
67 HARV. L. REV. 1136, 1138 (1954) (observing in the context of insurance with policy limits 
that the “company and insured often have conflicting interests as to whether settlement should 
be made”); Michael J. Meurer, The Gains from Faith in an Unfaithful Agent: Settlement Conflicts 
Between Defendants and Liability Insurers, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 502, 503 (1992) (“The essence 
of the conflict between the insurer and the insured inheres in the limits on indemnity provided 
by typical liability policies.”); Kathryn E. Spier, Litigation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 259, 331 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (showing how policy 
limits introduce conflict between insurers and policyholders); Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith” 
Refusal To Settle by Liability Insurers: Some Implications of the Judgment-Proof Problem, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 77, 77 (1994) (“[P]olicy limits create conflicts of interest between the insured and 
the insurer in the conduct of litigation.”); Sykes, supra note 33, at 1346 (“Disputes over the 
rejection of settlement offers by insurers would not arise absent provisions in insurance 
contracts setting policy limits . . . .”); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty To Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 
1127 (1990) (describing how policy limits encourage insurers to reject reasonable settlement 
offers and policyholders to accept unreasonable offers).  
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defendant with a single, $2M liability policy.44 Assume that the 
plaintiff has a 50 percent chance of winning $3M at trial and a 50 
percent chance of winning nothing. Assume further that the 
defendant has enough wealth to pay any above-limit damages.45 On 
these assumptions, the actuarially fair settlement amount, meaning 
the amount of the expected damages, is $1.5M.46 And settling for 
$1.5M rather than going to trial would minimize the combined costs 
to the defendant and the insurer,47 as trial would entail $1.5M in 
expected damages plus additional litigation expenses that settlement 
avoids. 
Consider what would happen, however, if the plaintiff offered to 
settle the case pre-trial for the actuarially fair amount. 
Table 1.  Liability When Expected Damages Within Primary Limit 
 
Expected 
Trial Liability 
Share of 
Collective 
Settlement 
Benefit (Cost) 
of Collective 
Settlement 
(Primary) Insurer, 
$2M limit 
$1.0M $1.5M ($0.5M) 
Defendant/Excess 
Insurer 
$0.5M $0M $0.5M 
Total $1.5M $1.5M — 
 
The defendant would be happy if this case settled for $1.5M, which is 
within the policy limit and hence would be paid entirely by the 
insurer. If the case instead went to trial, there would be a 50 percent 
chance of a $3M verdict, $1M of which would exceed the policy limit 
and thus be the defendant’s responsibility. The defendant’s expected 
trial liability therefore is $0.5M—that is, the expected damages above 
the policy limit—plus the additional attorneys’ fees and other 
 
 44. A generalized model of insurer-policyholder conflict over settlements is provided in the 
Appendix. 
 45. If personal assets are limited, the defendant’s exposure is the lesser of her net worth 
and the above-limit damages. For a general analysis of settlement negotiations with a judgment-
proof defendant, see Sykes, supra note 43. 
 46. (50% x $3M) + (50% x $0) = $1.5M.  
 47. Two implicit assumptions, which are not important to the points being illustrated, are 
that the time-value of money is zero and that the insurer and defendant are risk-neutral. As in 
all hypotheticals in the Article, this one also assumes a dichotomous set of trial outcomes, 
meaning that the plaintiff is awarded either the potential damages or nothing. 
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litigation expenses associated with trial. By contrast, her liability is 
zero if the case settles for the actuarially fair amount. Thus, as Table 1 
indicates, the benefit to the defendant of an actuarially fair settlement 
relative to trial, in terms of liability only (that is, excluding defense 
costs), is $0.5M. 
To the insurer, on the other hand, trial is the cheaper option in 
expected value terms. Although settlement would cost the insurer 
$1.5M, trial presents expected liability of only $1M, equal to the 
policy amount of $2M multiplied by the 50 percent chance of a verdict 
for the plaintiff. Thus, the cost to the insurer of a fair settlement 
relative to trial is $0.5M. Put another way, settling pre-trial for the 
expected damages instead of going to trial shifts $0.5M in liability 
from the defendant to the insurer, a shift the insurer will naturally 
resist. 
If the insurance policy covers not just liability to the plaintiff but 
also defense costs such as attorneys’ fees, then the insurer will be 
more inclined to settle pre-trial, as it will bear the defense’s trial 
expenses.48 Unless, however, those expenses would be at least $1M, 
the insurer will still be better off vetoing the actuarially fair 
settlement offer.49 In this way, bundling defense coverage with 
liability coverage only partly corrects the insurer’s underincentive to 
settle. 
The same structural conflict that makes the insurer too reluctant 
to settle makes the defendant overeager to do so. To see why, assume 
that the defense’s trial costs in the same hypothetical lawsuit would 
be $0.4M and that the plaintiff demands a settlement payment of $2M 
rather than the actuarially fair $1.5M. Now it is in the combined 
 
 48. If the case is a securities action, the insurer probably would not cover the fees of the 
plaintiff’s attorneys, as federal securities laws lack fee-shifting provisions. In theory, a plaintiff’s 
attorney could demand that a settlement include an amount for his fees and expenses. But 
because these are sunk costs, it is not rational for him to insist upon their reimbursement as a 
condition of settlement. On the other hand, derivative-suit settlements may include a provision 
for attorneys’ fees if, as is typical, the relief granted is injunctive rather than monetary. See 
Jessica M. Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1749, 1798 (2010) (finding that only about 10 percent of derivative-suit 
settlements over the one-year period from July 2005 to June 2006 included a cash payment to 
the corporation).  
 49. If the verdict is for the plaintiff, then the damages will exceed the policy limit, making 
the defense costs the responsibility of the defendant. Therefore, in this hypothetical lawsuit the 
insurer bears those costs only if the defendant wins at trial. If the defense’s trial expenses would 
be $1M, then the insurer’s overall expected trial liability is (0.5 x $2M) + (0.5 x $1M) = $1.5M. 
This analysis assumes that, as is standard in D&O policies, litigation expenses count toward the 
policy limit. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 136.  
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interest of the defense-side parties to reject the settlement demand, 
which exceeds the expected damages plus the defense’s trial expenses. 
Yet the defendant individually remains better off accepting the 
plaintiff’s demand instead of going to trial,50 as the $2M settlement 
would be fully covered by the insurer and would avoid the risk of an 
above-limit damages award.51 If the defendant and plaintiff could 
agree to enter into a settlement that bound the insurer, they might do 
so for an amount that overcompensates the plaintiff relative to the 
expected damages. 
If the defendant were a public corporation, it probably would 
have one or more excess insurance policies in addition to its $2M 
primary policy.52 To reflect this possibility, the hypothetical could be 
changed to assume that the defendant has a $3M excess policy to 
supplement its $2M primary policy. The consequence of this change 
would be that the excess insurer would step into the shoes of the 
defendant as summarized in Table 1, facing the same potential 
liability and thus being similarly biased toward pre-trial settlement.53 
Stated in general terms, defense-side parties on upper floors of an 
insurance tower tend to be biased in favor of settling before trial, and 
parties on lower floors tend to be biased against it.54  
 
 50. See Syverud, supra note 43, at 1130 (“Regardless of the strength of Plaintiff’s claim of 
liability, a rational Defendant might want to accept any proposed settlement that falls within the 
[insurance] company’s share of the potential liability.”). 
 51. In this example, the defendant’s total expected trial liability is $0.9M if the insurance 
policy provides liability coverage only. If the policy also provides defense coverage, then the 
defendant bears the $0.4M in trial litigation costs only when the plaintiff prevails and hence the 
total liability exceeds the policy limit. In such a case, the defendant’s total expected trial liability 
is $0.7M. 
 52. See TOWERS WATSON, supra note 18, at 18 fig.22 (finding that corporations which buy 
D&O insurance have an average of three full excess policies in addition to their primary policy). 
 53. See Syverud, supra note 43, at 1202 (observing how the excess insurer-primary insurer 
conflict parallels the insurer-policyholder conflict when a settlement offer is within the primary 
policy limit). 
 54. An analogy can be drawn to the conflict of interests between corporate creditors, who 
prefer that the corporation pursue safe (low-variance) projects, and corporate shareholders, 
who prefer risky (high-variance) projects. See Michael Simkovic & Benjamin S. Kaminetzky, 
Leveraged Buyout Bankruptcies, the Problem of Hindsight Bias, and the Credit Default Swap 
Solution, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 118, 215–18 (describing the creditor-shareholder conflict 
over risk preferences). Defense-side parties toward the bottom of a tower are analogues to 
corporate shareholders, as they prefer the high variance of outcomes offered by trial; defense-
side parties toward the top of a tower are like corporate creditors, as they prefer the safety of 
settlement. 
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C. The Conflict-Control Devices Now in Use 
At least three legal devices have been developed to address the 
defense-side conflict of interests over settlements. One device has 
already been mentioned: the bundling of defense coverage with 
liability coverage.55 That device is only partially effective because, as 
was illustrated by the hypothetical lawsuit summarized in Table 1, 
even when the insurer bears defense costs there will be cases in which 
the insurer’s expected trial liability is less than its share of a pre-trial 
settlement for the expected damages. 
The other two conflict-control devices are a pair of quasi-
contractual duties that are placed on liability insurers. Both duties 
require insurers to accept certain settlement offers even when doing 
so is contrary to their private interests. One of these, known as the 
“duty to settle,” arises when a plaintiff would be willing to settle 
within or at the insurer’s policy limit. This duty is straightforward in 
its implications and has been well analyzed in the academic 
literature.56 Much less famous—yet more problematic—is the second 
duty, which arises when the plaintiff makes a settlement demand 
above the insurer’s policy limit and the defendant or an excess insurer 
is willing to pay the above-limit portion. The question in such cases is 
not, strictly speaking, whether the insurer has a duty to settle, but 
rather whether it must “tender”—that is, contribute—its policy 
amount in support of a settlement negotiated and partly funded by 
another defense-side party. Courts have held that the answer often is 
yes, thereby creating the duty that is termed here the “duty to 
contribute.” 
1. Settlement Demands Within the Policy Limit:  The Duty To 
Settle. The standard statement of the duty to settle is that a liability 
insurer must agree to settle a case if it can do so for a reasonable 
 
 55. See supra text accompanying note 48. 
 56. E.g., Seth J. Chandler, Reconsidering the Duty To Settle, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 741 (1993); 
David A. Hyman, Bernard Black & Charles Silver, Settlement at Policy Limits and the Duty To 
Settle: Evidence from Texas, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 48, 49–52 (2011); Keeton, supra note 
43, at 1137–48; Meurer, supra note 43, at 503–15; Charles Silver, Commentary, A Missed 
Misalignment of Interests: A Comment on Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 77 VA. L. REV. 1585 
(1991); Spier, supra note 43, at 331; Sykes, supra note 43, at 88–99; Sykes, supra note 33, at 
1349–53; Syverud, supra note 43, at 1163–72. 
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amount within its policy limit.57 The penalty for breach is forfeiture of 
the limit, leaving the insurer responsible for the full damages award at 
trial plus any other consequential damages.58 The duty has a 
contractual basis: while liability policies typically require the 
policyholder to seek the insurer’s consent before settling, they 
provide that consent will not be “unreasonably withheld.”59 Courts, 
however, impose the duty to settle even on those insurers that do not 
assume it explicitly, most often by holding that the duty is an aspect of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract.60 
To determine whether an insurer breached the duty to settle, 
courts ask whether “a prudent insurer without policy limits would 
have accepted the settlement offer.”61 As a matter of theory this 
approach has some appeal. Recall the earlier hypothetical lawsuit 
(summarized in Table 1) in which the actuarially fair settlement 
amount was $1.5M. Settling for that figure was in the combined 
interests of the defendant and the insurer, as trial entailed that 
amount in expected damages plus additional litigation expenses. Yet 
if the insurer were to consider its financial interests alone, it might 
reject a $1.5M settlement demand, as its policy limit causes its 
expected trial liability to be only $1.0M. On the other hand, if its 
policy lacked a limit, the insurer’s expected trial liability would be 
$1.5M, making the insurer better off accepting a settlement demand 
for that amount to avoid the expenses of trial.62 Thus, assuming that a 
court would deem the $1.5M settlement demand reasonable, applying 
the duty to settle would overcome the insurer’s structural disincentive 
 
 57. The courts of all but two states have explicitly recognized a duty to settle along these 
lines. JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS 9-146 & n.363 (3d ed. 
2006 & Supp. 2010). 
 58. Id. at 9-147; see, e.g., Birth Ctr. v. St. Paul Cos., 787 A.2d 376, 389 (Pa. 2001). 
 59. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 140 (quoting a common policy form) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
 60. See, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 659 (Cal. 1999) 
(“Pursuant to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which is implied by law in every 
liability insurance policy, the insurer has a duty to make reasonable efforts to settle a claim 
against its insured by the insured’s victimwhich accords with the public policy favoring 
settlements.” (citations omitted)); see also Ganaway v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 554, 
556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the duty to settle “sounds in tort, not in contract”). 
 61. Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 1967); see also Wierck v. Grinnell Mut. 
Reinsurance Co., 456 N.W.2d 191, 195 (Iowa 1990) (“If, but for the policy limits, the insurer 
would settle for an offered amount, it is obliged to do so . . . .”). 
 62. See Spier, supra note 43, at 331 (showing how the duty to settle aligns insurer and 
policyholder interests). 
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to settle and produce what appears to be the socially preferable 
result. 
Although courts consistently specify that the duty to settle only 
requires insurers to accept settlement demands that are reasonable, 
the duty would seem to serve its conflict-correction function even if 
this qualification were dropped and the duty were triggered by any 
settlement demand within the insurer’s policy limit.63 Under this 
alternative, the prospect of uncapped trial liability would 
automatically align the insurer’s interest with those of its 
policyholder. For example, if the insurer in the hypothetical case 
summarized in Table One faced unlimited trial liability, and the 
defense’s trial expenses would be $0.4M, then the insurer would face 
total expected trial costs (expected damages plus expenses) of $1.9M. 
In that case the insurer would accept a pre-trial settlement demand of 
$1.5M but not $2.0M, because if the plaintiff insisted on $2.0M then 
the insurer would be better off going to trial. In this way, the duty to 
settle is self-regulating, as it encourages insurers to accept actuarially 
fair settlement demands but not those in which the plaintiff is 
overreaching. 
Based on similar reasoning, several commentators have 
concluded that the duty to settle should be converted to a strict-
liability rule under which an insurer automatically forfeits its policy 
limit whenever it rejects a settlement demand within that limit, 
regardless of whether the demand is reasonable.64 This version of the 
rule has two apparent advantages. It removes the structural conflict of 
interests caused by the policy limit when the settlement demand is 
within that limit, thereby avoiding strategic bargaining by the insurer 
and the policyholder. And it further reduces litigation costs by 
eliminating the need for follow-up lawsuits between policyholders 
and insurers over the reasonableness of rejected settlement offers.65 
 
 63. See, e.g., Hyman et al., supra note 56, at 79 (finding that a strict-liability rule “would 
give insurers the right incentives to settle” and would “reduce litigation costs”); Sykes, supra 
note 43, at 94–95 (finding that a duty to settle corrects the conflict of interests even when not 
limited to settlement demands that are less than the expected damages). 
 64. See, e.g., Hyman et al., supra note 56, at 79; Keeton, supra note 43, at 1183–84; Victor 
E. Schwartz, Statutory Strict Liability for an Insurer’s Failure To Settle: A Balanced Plan for an 
Unresolved Problem, 1975 DUKE L.J. 901, 911; see also Crisci, 426 P.2d at 177 (Cal. 1967) 
(collecting law review notes advocating a strict-liability rule). 
 65. See Crisci, 426 P.2d at 177 (describing the benefits of a strict-liability version of the duty 
to settle); Keeton, supra note 43, at 1183–84 (arguing that a strict-liability rule would reduce the 
costs of duty-to-settle litigation); Schwartz, supra note 64, at 910 (same); Syverud, supra note 43, 
at 1168 (same). 
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Despite the apparent advantages of a strict-liability approach, 
courts continue to subject the duty to settle to a reasonableness 
standard.66 In practice, however, many insurers treat any settlement 
demand within their policy limit as creating a high risk of liability.67 
These insurers probably fear hindsight bias: the duty to settle is 
litigated only after a plaintiff has won an above-limit damages 
award,68 at which point the insurer may find it difficult to convince a 
judge or jury that the within-limit settlement demand that the insurer 
previously rejected was unreasonable. Indeed, the California 
Supreme Court has held that the mere fact of an above-limit damages 
award supports an inference that accepting a pre-trial demand within 
the limit would have been “the most reasonable method of dealing 
with the claim.”69 
2. Demands Above the Cap: The Duty To Contribute.  Scholars 
who have analyzed the settlement conflict among liability insurers 
and policyholders have focused on the fact pattern that triggers the 
traditional duty to settle: a settlement offer within the policy limit. 
Much less has been written about the nature of the conflict when the 
plaintiff demands more.70 And next to nothing has been written about 
how courts actually define insurer duties in above-limit demand 
cases.71 One possible explanation for this lack of commentary is that 
 
 66. ROBERT JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 902 (3d ed. 2002).  
 67. See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in 
Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 292 (2001) (“Although the duty to settle is evaluated on a 
reasonableness standard, the lawyers spoke as if it was subject to a strict liability standard. As a 
result, once the plaintiff makes an offer to settle within limits, it appears that all the lawyers 
involved assume that the insurance company will ‘make good’ on any judgment . . . .” (citations 
omitted)). 
 68. The duty might also be invoked if the damages award is within the limit but the total 
litigation costs—damages plus defense costs—exceed it. 
 69. Crisci, 426 P.2d at 177. On the other hand, some courts have held that breaching the 
duty to settle does not make the insurer responsible for punitive damages assessed against the 
policyholder, as these are uninsurable as a matter of public policy. E.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. 
Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 653, 652 (Cal. 1999). 
 70. Although several commentators have addressed above-limit settlement offers, they 
have treated them as requiring only a simple extension of their analyses of below-limit offers, 
and thus as raising no interesting new questions. See, e.g., Sykes, supra note 43, at 108–10 
(considering in an appendix the implications of imposing a settlement duty on insurers when the 
settlement offer is above the policy limit and concluding “[a]lthough the details have changed, 
the basic structure of the solution has not”); Syverud, supra note 43, at 1131 (finding that the 
essential conflict of interests is the same regardless of whether the settlement demand is above 
or below the policy limits). 
 71. The most extensive discussion of legal duties in this situation is provided by Professor 
Robert Keeton, who devoted three pages to it in his fifty-one-page law review article on insurer 
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the analysis of such cases seems, at least at first glance, 
straightforward: the policyholder has paid for only a limited amount 
of coverage, and so the insurer should be under no presumptive 
obligation to settle for amounts above that limit.72 To hold otherwise 
would effectively read coverage limits out of policies, which 
ultimately would hurt policyholders by driving up insurance 
premiums. It is probably for this reason that most judicial statements 
of the duty to settle are careful to specify that the duty applies only to 
within-limit settlement offers.73  
Matters become more complicated, however, when a settlement 
demand is above the insurer’s policy limit but the defendant or an 
excess insurer is willing to pay the above-limit portion. If the insurer 
is asked to participate in such a settlement and refuses, what should 
its liability be, if any? Strictly speaking, this fact pattern is not 
encompassed by the traditional duty to settle, as the total settlement 
is greater than the policy amount. Moreover, the consequences of 
imposing a duty on the insurer in such a case are different in 
important ways from those of the traditional duty to settle. For these 
reasons, it is useful to have a separate term for the insurer’s 
obligations in such a case, which is why this Article refers to a distinct 
“duty to contribute.” 
The duty to contribute almost never comes up in cases involving 
personal liability coverage such as automobile and homeowners 
insurance,74 as plaintiffs in such cases rarely try to settle for more than 
the defendant’s policy limit. For the typical holder of, for example, a 
personal automobile policy, the policy itself may be her most valuable 
 
settlement duties. Keeton, supra note 43, at 1148–50. Those pages are concerned primarily with 
the risks that the insurer faces when asking the policyholder to contribute to a settlement. This 
Article’s focus, by contrast, is on the opposite fact pattern: when the policyholder or an excess 
insurer asks the primary insurer to contribute. In his article on the duty to settle, Professor Alan 
Sykes observed only that “[s]ome controversy exists [over] whether liability will attach when the 
settlement offer exceeds the policy limits but the insured would have been willing to make up 
the difference.” Sykes, supra note 43, at 98. His article thus does not countenance a duty to 
contribute in the type of case in which the duty seems most often to arise: when the defendant 
or excess insurer actually settles the case and then sues the primary insurer for the primary 
policy amount. See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
 72. See Wierck v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 456 N.W. 2d 191, 195 (Iowa 1990) (“It is 
an extraordinary thing to require an insurer to pay more than the policy limits.”). 
 73. See, e.g., Jackson v. Am. Equity Ins. Co., 90 P.3d 136, 142 (Alaska 2004); Crisci, 426 
P.2d at 176; Ganaway v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Birth 
Ctr. v. St. Paul Cos., 787 A.2d 376, 379 (Pa. 2001).  
 74. See, e.g., Hyman et al., supra note 56, at 61 & tbl.1 (finding in medical-malpractice cases 
that a high percentage of final settlement demands are at or below the policy limit).  
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recoverable asset: her home may be mortgaged to the bank, and her 
other personal assets may be trivial. A plaintiff suing such a 
policyholder for injuries covered by her policy will often be better off 
demanding no more than her policy amount, thereby permitting the 
plaintiff to negotiate exclusively with the liability insurer, an 
experienced litigant who has deep pockets and who is accustomed to 
reaching into them to end a lawsuit.75 
Fact patterns that implicate the duty to contribute are more 
common in lawsuits against corporate defendants, as such defendants 
often buy tiered liability coverage from multiple insurers. Tiered 
coverage means that liability above the primary policy limit is borne 
not by the defendants but rather by another insurer. It is thus 
predictable that, in lawsuits against defendants protected by 
insurance towers, the plaintiff often makes a demand that exceeds the 
primary limit, thereby pulling at least one excess insurer into the 
settlement negotiation.76 And the excess insurer and plaintiff may 
then reach a settlement conditioned on the willingness of the primary 
insurer, and any other subsituated excess insurers, to contribute their 
policy amounts. The question of interest then becomes, what happens 
if one (or more) of these lower-level insurers refuses to participate? 
One possible outcome is that the proposed settlement falls apart and 
the case goes to trial. Courts might then be tempted to hold that the 
logic underpinning the traditional duty to settle extends to this fact 
pattern as well, making the dissenting insurer liable for the full 
damages award—including any portion outside its policy limits—if 
the rejected settlement offer was reasonable.77 And this is in fact how 
courts presented with this scenario have ruled.78 
 
 75. For a model of settlement negotiations in which the insurer and policyholder are jointly 
made better off by a clause in the insurance policy that credibly disables the policyholder from 
contributing to a settlement, see Meurer, supra note 43, at 510.  
 76. See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 145–47.  
 77. Commentators who see no legally relevant differences between above-limit and below-
limit settlement offers appear to have this particular fact pattern in mind. See supra note 70. 
 78. See Ranger Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 389 So. 2d 272, 277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1980) (holding that a primary insurer can be liable to an excess insurer for damages above the 
primary limit if the primary insurer rejects an above-limit settlement demand on which the 
excess insurer offered to pay the above-limit portion); see also Lexington Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. 
Co., 886 F. Supp. 837, 839–40 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (applying Ranger Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. 
Co., 389 So. 2d 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)). A wrinkle is that the duty to settle is formally 
owed to the policyholder, whereas excess insurers may be the main victims of a lower-level 
insurer’s settlement veto. Most courts get around this technicality, which also comes up in 
traditional duty-to-settle claims asserted by excess insurers against primary insurers, by holding 
that an excess insurer is subrogated to the policyholder’s rights when another insurer’s bad faith 
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The second potential outcome of such a settlement negotiation—
and the one that seems more common in practice—is that, after the 
lower-level insurer refuses to participate, the excess insurer that 
negotiated the settlement pays the full settlement out of its own 
pocket and then sues the dissenting insurer for the latter’s policy 
amount. In such cases, must the dissenting insurer, which in most 
cases is the primary insurer, pay over its policy amount to defray the 
costs of a settlement to which it did not consent? In the decisions that 
have addressed this question directly, most courts have held that the 
answer is yes.79 California courts in particular have consistently held 
that the dissenting insurer’s duty to contribute in such cases is 
essentially automatic.80 By contrast, opinions from other jurisdictions 
hold that the dissenting insurer’s duty to contribute (again, not the 
courts’ term) shares a common foundation with the duty to settle and 
hence arises only if the overall settlement amount is reasonable.81  
Although none of the decisions recognizing a duty to contribute 
says so explicitly, one possible rationale for the duty is that it, like the 
duty to settle, counteracts the structural disincentive of lower-level 
insurers to accept actuarially fair settlement demands. As an 
illustration, consider again a hypothetical defendant who has a 
primary liability policy of $2M and an excess policy of $3M. As 
before, we will assume that the defendant faces a lawsuit in which the 
plaintiff has a 50 percent chance of prevailing, but now we will 
assume that the potential damages are $5M rather than $3M. In 
 
causes the excess insurer to suffer a loss. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & 
Surety Co., 792 P.2d 749, 752–53 & 752 n.2 (Ariz. 1990) (collecting such cases). 
 79. See, e.g., Westerholm v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 130 Cal. Rptr. 164, 165–68 (Ct. App. 
1976); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 238 N.W.2d 862, 868 (Minn. 1976); Fireman’s Fund 
Ins. Co. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 367 A.2d 864, 869 (N.J. 1976); Evans v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 245 
P.2d 470, 479 (Wash. 1952); see also Pac. Indem. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 48 Cal. Rptr. 667, 
671–72 (Ct. App. 1966) (holding that an excess insurer which settled a case for a reasonable 
amount within the primary policy limit could recover the full settlement amount from the 
primary insurer). The only contrary holding is in the case of Sentry Ins. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. 
Co., No. LF-2387-4, 2000 WL 288467, at *1–2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 2000).  
 80. See, e.g., Pac. Indem. Co., 48 Cal. Rptr. at 671; see also Schwartz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 539 F.3d 135, 141 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying California law). 
 81. See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund, 367 A.2d at 869; Evans, 245 P.2d at 479. Some courts 
recognize a more expansive duty to contribute when the insurer in bad faith denies coverage or 
refuses to defend its policyholder, in which case the policyholder may settle and then sue the 
insurer to recover the full settlement amount, including any above-limit portion. See Traders & 
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621, 627 (10th Cir. 1942) (“Some courts permit a 
recovery by the assured against the insurer for losses sustained in excess of the limits of the 
policy, based upon the negligent conduct of insurer, resulting in losses to the assured in excess of 
the limits of the policy.”).  
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contrast with the hypothetical lawsuit summarized in Table 1, the 
expected damages in this case ($2.5M) exceed the primary policy 
limit.82 
Table 2. Liability When Expected Damages Exceed Primary Limit 
 Expected 
Trial Liability 
Share of 
Collective 
Settlement  
Benefit (Cost) 
of Collective 
Settlement 
(Primary) Insurer, 
$2M limit 
$1.0M $2.0M ($1.0M) 
Defendant/Excess 
Insurer 
$1.5M $0.5M $1.0M 
Total $2.5M $2.5M — 
 
To avoid trial expenses, the defense-side parties are collectively 
better off settling pre-trial for the expected damages of $2.5M. And 
the plaintiff prefers this result as well, for the same reason. But the 
primary insurer will resist, as its liability would then be $2M (its 
policy amount), whereas its expected trial liability is only $1M.83 To 
overcome this obstacle to an insured settlement, a court might create 
a rule under which the primary insurer forfeits its policy limit 
whenever it refuses to participate in a settlement that requires it to 
contribute no more than its policy amount.84 Alternatively, the court 
could permit an excess insurer who settles the case for a “reasonable” 
amount to recover the primary policy amount from the primary 
insurer. In either of these forms, a duty to contribute placed on the 
primary insurer seemingly moves settlement negotiations toward the 
socially preferable result. 
Professors Baker and Griffith have observed that excess D&O 
insurers often put settlement pressure on the insurers below them in 
an insurance tower, especially when the excess insurers are willing to 
pay the portions of the settlement demand that fall within their slices 
of the liability range.85 Court decisions recognizing a duty to 
 
 82. The Appendix contains a generalized model of insurer-policyholder conflict in above-
limit demand cases. 
 83. (50% x $2M) (the policy limit) + (50% x $0) = $1M.  
 84. Without a policy limit the insurer’s expected trial liability is $2.5M, the same as the 
settlement offer, giving the insurer the necessary incentive to accept that offer, especially if the 
insurer would also be responsible for the defense’s trial expenses. 
 85. See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 149. 
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contribute explain the source of this pressure. Objecting to settlement 
is of little advantage to a lower-level insurer if the case will settle 
anyway and a court then will force the insurer to pay over its policy 
amount—plus, most likely, interest. And if its objection scuttles the 
settlement, the insurer may be forced to pay the entire subsequent 
damages award, including the portion above its policy limit. 
Besides counteracting lower-level insurers’ bias against settling 
when the trial outcome is uncertain, the duty to contribute may also 
ameliorate a problem with collective settlements that can arise even 
in cases in which the plaintiff has a 100 percent chance of prevailing at 
trial. Settling such a case pre-trial confers a benefit on the insurers in 
the tower that are responsible for liability in excess of the lawsuit’s 
potential damages, as it is those insurers, rather than the insurers 
below them, whose overall liability would be increased by the 
litigation expenses that settlement avoids. Knowing that settlement 
reduces the liability of these upper-level insurers, lower-level insurers 
might strategically withhold their consent to settlement in order to 
negotiate for a reduced share of the overall settlement burden. This 
risk of holdouts, which constitutes a classic collective-action problem, 
increases with the number of insurers in the tower. Strategic 
negotiating of this type can introduce delay and cause negotiations to 
collapse.86 The duty to contribute can be seen as a device for defeating 
such holdouts and forcing them to pay their contractually assigned 
share of the settlement burden. 
The discussion to this point has considered only the apparent 
virtues of the duty to contribute, one of which—counteracting lower-
level insurers’ bias against settling—it shares with the duty to settle. 
The implication might seem to be that the duty to contribute should 
be governed by a strict-liability rule rather than a reasonableness 
standard, just as scholars have advocated for the duty to settle.87 But 
drawing this inference would be a mistake. As will be discussed in the 
next Part, the duty to contribute lacks the duty to settle’s self-
regulating virtue. Rather than discouraging plaintiff overreach, the 
duty to contribute rewards it, producing a plaintiff-overcompensation 
hazard that does not arise under the duty to settle even when that 
duty is not restricted to “reasonable” settlement offers. This downside 
of the duty to contribute raises the question whether the better 
 
 86. See Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 359 (1991) 
(describing how holdouts can cause negotiation breakdowns). 
 87. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
SQUIRE IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2012  12:50 PM 
2012] COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENTS 27 
solution to the conflict that arises from above-limit settlement offers 
would be to eliminate the collective settlement process that is that 
conflict’s source. 
II.  THE SOCIAL COSTS OF DEFENSE-SIDE CONFLICT CONTROL 
The previous Part described how the bundling of liability 
coverage with defense coverage, the duty to settle, and the duty to 
contribute all act against an insurer’s structural disincentive to settle 
when the trial outcome is uncertain and the potential damages exceed 
the insurer’s policy limit. None of these conflict-control devices 
directly addresses the countervailing bias, which is the overeagerness 
of defendants and upper-level excess insurers to settle pre-trial when 
doing so would shift liability onto primary and lower-level excess 
insurers.88 The implication is that the current set of conflict-control 
devices increases the proportion of lawsuit settlements paid by lower-
level insurers rather than by upper-level insurers and defendants. To 
the extent that defendants are risk-averse, this shifting of their 
liability onto insurers may seem efficient.89 But the conflict-control 
devices achieve this result by introducing several costly distortions, all 
of which are byproducts of the practice whereby defense-side parties 
settle collectively. 
A. Plaintiff Overcompensation Under the Duty To Contribute 
Although scholarly commentary on insurer-policyholder conflict 
in settlement negotiations has been extensive, it has overlooked how 
the duty to contribute systematically encourages settlements that 
overcompensate plaintiffs.90 And courts that enforce that duty seem 
unaware of this hazard as well. Yet the hazard should be heeded, as 
systematic plaintiff overcompensation will tend to generate a variety 
of social costs including too many lawsuits, overspending on lawyers, 
and, ultimately, more expensive liability insurance. 
 
 88. At least in theory, subjecting the duty to contribute to a reasonableness standard could 
help countervail this bias toward pre-trial settlement. As noted, not all courts apply a 
reasonableness standard in such cases. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 89. POSNER, supra note 34, at 131. 
 90. Other scholars have spoken of a plaintiff-overcompensation problem in connection 
with the awarding of non-economic damages (such as punitive damages) for breach of the duty 
to settle. See, e.g., Chandler, supra note 56, at 744. The plaintiff-overcompensation hazard 
described here, by contrast, arises specifically in duty to contribute cases, and occurs even if 
economic (“compensatory”) damages are the only type available in the lawsuit. 
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To see how the duty to contribute distorts negotiations in favor 
of plaintiffs, consider again the hypothetical lawsuit summarized in 
Table 2, in which the defendant has a $2M primary policy and a $3M 
excess policy, and the plaintiff has a 50 percent chance of losing at a 
trial and a 50 percent chance of winning $5M. Rather than assuming, 
however, that the plaintiff makes an actuarially fair settlement 
demand of $2.5M, consider what could happen instead if the plaintiff 
made a more aggressive demand of $3M. In that case, it is cheaper in 
expected value terms for the defense-side parties to go to trial, at least 
as long as their trial expenses would be less than $0.5M.91 But from 
the individual perspective of the excess insurer, accepting the $3M 
settlement demand is still better than trial as long as it can use the 
duty to contribute to force the primary insurer to tender its policy 
amount of $2M. The excess insurer’s net settlement liability would 
then be $1M, whereas its expected trial liability, as noted in Table 2, is 
$1.5M (plus potential trial expenses).92 In this way, the duty to 
contribute has what we might call a “cramdown” effect: it enables a 
plaintiff and excess insurer (or defendant) to improve their positions 
relative to trial by shifting liability down the tower onto the primary 
insurer. The result in this hypothetical lawsuit is a settlement that 
overcompensates the plaintiff relative to the expected damages. 
A possible objection is that the plaintiff’s settlement demand of 
$3M seems noncredible given that the expected damages are only 
$2.5M. The excess insurer seemingly could negotiate the plaintiff 
down to the actuarially fair amount, saving itself $0.5M. By the same 
logic, however, the excess insurer’s rejection of the $3M settlement 
demand is noncredible given that settling for that amount would cost 
it only $1M, whereas its expected trial liability is at least $1.5M. The 
plaintiff therefore should be able to negotiate the total settlement 
amount up to $3.5M, thereby capturing the $2.5M in expected 
damages plus the $1M potential benefit to the excess insurer of 
avoiding trial. In fact, any settlement between $2.5M and $3.5M 
would be mutually beneficial to the excess insurer and the plaintiff 
relative to trial.93 And only at the bottom end of this range is the 
plaintiff not overcompensated as measured by the expected damages. 
 
 91. Because the expected damages are $2.5M, trial is preferable to settlement as long as 
trial costs would be less than $0.5M. 
 92. 50% x ($5M - $2M) = $1.5M. 
 93. Including defense costs widens the potential settlement range. For example, if the 
plaintiff and the excess insurer would have to incur $0.2M each in trial costs, the settlement 
range widens to $2.3M through $3.7M. This aspect of the negotiation dynamic is not, however, 
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What is happening here is that the plaintiff and excess insurer are 
bargaining to divide between themselves a $1M transfer away from 
the primary insurer. The transfer equals the difference between the 
primary insurer’s policy amount ($2M) and its expected trial liability 
($1M).94 The transfer is available to the other parties to a collective 
settlement, which is why the range of settlements mutually beneficial 
to the plaintiff and excess insurer is $1M wide. Excluding trial 
expenses, the transfer away from a primary insurer produced by the 
duty to contribute, and hence the potential amount of plaintiff 
overcompensation, can be expressed as follows: 
 
(1) If L < D, then T = L – pL 
(2) If L > D, then T = 0 
 
where T is the transfer, L is the primary limit, D is the potential 
damages (the damages award if the plaintiff wins at trial), and p is the 
probability (between 0 and 1) of a verdict for the plaintiff. Equation 
(1) states that, as long as the potential damages exceed the primary 
limit, the transfer equals the primary limit minus the primary insurer’s 
expected trial liability. Equation (2) states that no transfer will occur 
if the potential damages do not exceed the primary limit.95 In that case 
the excess insurer (or, in the absence of excess insurance, the 
defendant) has no financial incentive to participate in a settlement, 
and thus the duty to contribute will not normally be invoked.96 
 
particular to duty-to-contribute cases, as it applies to any negotiation in which the alternative to 
settlement is trial. See Spier, supra note 43, at 330. For a fuller treatment, see the Appendix. 
 94. In theory, plaintiff overcompensation is also a hazard in the hypothetical illustrated in 
Table 1, in which the expected damages of $1.5M are within the primary limit of $2M. The 
excess insurer faces $0.5M in expected trial liability and therefore should be willing to settle for 
as much as $2.5M as long as it can use the duty to contribute to force the primary insurer to pay 
$2M. As the equations in the text indicate, plaintiff overcompensation is a possibility whenever 
the potential damages exceed the primary limit—even if, as is true in Table 1, the expected 
damages are within that limit. But the hazard is smaller in that instance because of the larger 
gap between the expected damages and the minimum settlement demand that would bring the 
excess insurer into the case. This gap makes it less likely that the plaintiff will be able to make a 
credible settlement demand that entails liability for the excess insurer. 
 95. Including trial expenses would generally reduce the transfer by the defense’s trial 
expenses multiplied by the probability of a verdict for the defendant. A more general formula 
that includes trial expenses is derived in the Appendix.   
 96. The same consideration also means that the plaintiff must have a chance of prevailing, 
i.e., p must be greater than 0. And p must be less than 1 for T to have a positive value. Thus, as 
noted in Part I.B, the conflict of interest arises only if the trial outcome is uncertain. 
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These equations have two worrisome implications from a social-
welfare perspective. The first is that the overcompensation hazard is 
greatest in those cases that are the least meritorious. Our proxy for 
merit is p, the plaintiff’s probability of winning at trial. If we hold L 
(the primary limit) constant in Equation (1), T (the value transfer) 
rises as p falls.97 
The second worrisome implication is that, if the defendant has 
constructed an insurance tower, then the overcompensation hazard 
increases with the number of policies in the tower. To see why, we 
must first broaden the definition of L to signify not the primary policy 
limit per se but rather the limit of whichever policy in the tower is 
closest to the potential damages without exceeding them. The 
equations remain valid with this modification because once any 
excess insurer or the defendant agrees to a settlement that would fall 
within its contractually allocated slice of the liability range, all 
subsituated insurers (the primary insurer plus any lower-level excess 
insurers) are collectively subject to the duty to contribute, and hence 
are like a single primary insurer for purposes of calculating the value 
transfer captured by the settlement. 
With this adjustment in mind, two observations lead to the 
conclusion that the overcompensation hazard rises with the number 
of policies in the tower. First, note that if the plaintiff’s probability of 
success (p) and the potential damages (D) are held constant, the 
transfer (T) increases with the policy limit (L) as long as the limit 
does not reach the potential damages. Put another way, the transfer is 
largest when the distance between the potential damages and the 
nearest underlying policy limit is smallest. Second, note that if the 
defendant faces a set of possible lawsuits with potential damages that 
are randomly distributed across the liability range encompassed by 
the tower, then the expected distance between the potential damages 
in any given suit and the nearest subsituated policy limit decreases as 
the number of policies in the tower increases. In combination, these 
observations mean that, if the total damages range covered by the 
tower is held constant, then the potential for plaintiff 
overcompensation increases with the number of policies in the tower. 
 
 97. For example, if we take the hypothetical lawsuit summarized in Table 2 but assume that 
p = 25% rather than 50%, then T is $1.5M rather than $1M. On that assumption, the actuarially 
fair settlement amount is $1.25M, which is less than the excess policy limit. But the excess 
insurer faces expected trial liability of $0.75M and therefore would be willing to accept any 
settlement up to $2.75M as long as it can use the duty to contribute to defray its costs by the 
$2M primary policy amount. 
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When an excess insurer negotiates with a plaintiff to divide the 
wealth transfer created by the duty to contribute, which of them will 
have the stronger bargaining position? At least in the context of 
shareholder litigation, there are reasons to think that both parties will 
be under pressure to settle. Because the excess insurer will have sold 
a diversified portfolio of policies, it may be more risk-neutral than the 
plaintiff. On the other hand, the plaintiff’s settlement decision will 
likely be made by a plaintiffs’ attorney, who may be part of a firm 
that itself has a diversified set of pending lawsuits. In addition, the 
excess insurer will probably be under strong settlement pressure from 
the defendant-managers, who will want the lawsuit settled quickly. 
Professors Baker and Griffith report that corporate managers desire 
quick settlements of shareholder lawsuits, and are willing to tolerate 
higher settlement amounts to attain them, in order to avoid ongoing 
negative publicity.98 These observations suggest that plaintiffs and 
excess insurers typically negotiate on roughly equal footing. If this 
suggestion is correct, then settlement negotiations indeed are biased 
strongly toward plaintiff overcompensation, which is avoided only if 
the excess insurer has such a strong bargaining advantage that it 
captures the entire value transfer for itself. 
A question to be addressed at this point is whether the insurers 
in a tower could prevent the plaintiff-overcompensation hazard by 
bargaining among themselves after a lawsuit is brought. For example, 
in the hypothetical lawsuit summarized in Table 2, could the excess 
insurer pay the primary insurer to accept responsibility for the excess 
policy? Doing so would effectively collapse the primary and excess 
policies into one, rendering the duty to contribute inapplicable and 
eliminating the cramdown dynamic that leads to plaintiff 
overcompensation.99 To transfer its policy to the primary insurer, 
however, the excess insurer would need permission from the 
policyholder under the common law rule that forbids a promisor 
(here, the excess insurer) from delegating its obligations to a third 
party (the primary insurer) without a “novation” from the promisee 
 
 98. See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 155. 
 99. The primary insurer would be willing to accept responsibility for the excess policy for a 
payment of as little as $0.5M, which is clearly better for the excess insurer than the hypothetical 
$1M it would have to pay into a $3M settlement. The primary insurer presumably would then 
settle the entire lawsuit with the plaintiff for the $2.5M in expected damages, giving it net 
liability of $2M, the same as its liability in a cramdown settlement.  
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(the policyholder).100 And the policyholder in our hypothetical would 
have little reason to permit the transfer. Reassignment of policies 
among insurers would defeat one of the main functions of insurance 
towers, which is to reduce the policyholder’s exposure to each 
insurer’s individual bankruptcy risk.101 Indeed, if the insurers in a 
tower could freely reassign liability among themselves, they could 
mutually profit by transferring all of their liability to the insurer who 
is least creditworthy, which is the type of result that the novation rule 
seems intended to avoid.102 
Alternatively, the primary insurer might try to prevent a 
cramdown settlement by selling a reinsurance policy to the excess 
insurer for the full excess-policy amount. Like an outright transfer of 
the excess policy to the primary insurer, such a reinsurance policy 
would seemingly consolidate liability in the primary insurer, but 
without requiring a novation from the policyholder. Reinsurance by 
itself would, however, only exacerbate the plaintiff-overcompensation 
risk, as then the excess insurer would be fully insulated from liability 
and hence have no incentive to refuse any settlement demand at all. 
For this reason, a cramdown settlement could be avoided only if the 
excess insurer bought a reinsurance policy from the primary insurer 
and transferred to the primary insurer full authority to settle on 
behalf of both insurers. But such a delegation of authority would 
create a significant liability risk for the excess insurer, as courts have 
consistently held that an insurer cannot use reinsurance to relieve 
itself of the duty to settle it owes its policyholder.103 This rule against 
 
 100. ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 939–40 (2d 
ed. 1993) (“An effective delegation does not discharge an obligor until contracted performance 
is provided by the delegate. A discharge may result, however, if the parties engage in a 
novation.”). 
 101. See TOWERS WATSON, supra note 42, at 26 (finding that purchasers of primary D&O 
insurance identify “financial strength” as the most important insurer selection criterion). 
 102. Imagine that Insurer A could sell a given policy for a $100 premium but Insurer B, due 
to credit risk, could sell the same policy for only $50. The two could mutually gain at the 
expense of a policyholder if Insurer A sold the policy for $100 and then paid Insurer B $75 to 
assume it. 
 103. Royal Transit, Inc. v. Ctr. Sur. & Ins. Corp., 168 F.2d 345, 350 (7th Cir. 1948); Zumwalt 
v. Utils. Ins. Co., 228 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Mo. 1950); accord Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. N. River Ins. 
Co., No. 88 CIV.0789 (RWS), 1990 WL 102879, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1990) (“[A]n insurer 
owes to its insured a good faith obligation to make coverage determination[s] without regard to 
whether or not the risk is reinsured.”); see also STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS: 
LIABILITY AND DAMAGES § 4:20 (2d ed. 1997) (“In the reinsurance context . . . the primary 
insurer does not relinquish control to the reinsurer . . . .”); Keeton, supra note 43, at 1150 (“As 
between [insurance] company and insured, the company cannot escape any of its responsibilities 
by reinsurance.”). Could an excess insurer that has delegated control over settlement 
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delegation of settlement authority is consistent with the novation rule, 
as both protect the policyholder from actions by an insurer that might 
deprive the policyholder of the full benefits of the insurance contract. 
Going a step further, the excess insurer could try to include a 
clause in its policy that expressly permitted it to delegate settlement 
authority to another insurer. But there is reason to doubt that 
corporate managers would be willing to buy a D&O policy that 
contained such a clause. As will be discussed in Part IV, managers 
have a strong incentive to preserve the duty to contribute’s cramdown 
dynamic in order to encourage insurer-covered settlements even 
when the total settlement amount exceeds the expected damages. 
Therefore, ex post bargaining among insurers in a tower—that is, 
bargaining that occurs after a lawsuit is filed—does not seem to be a 
viable solution to the plaintiff-overcompensation hazard created by 
the duty to contribute. 
Although they seem unable to bargain around cramdown 
settlements ex post, insurers can adjust to the risk of such settlements 
ex ante by charging higher premiums. The burden of the higher 
premiums is ultimately borne by the shareholders of the corporations 
that buy the insurance. For this reason, corporate shareholders, 
despite being the plaintiffs in shareholder lawsuits, derive no net 
benefit from systematic plaintiff overcompensation in such cases. 
Rather, the lawsuits benefit shareholders only if they deter 
managerial misconduct in a cost-effective manner, a result that 
excessive settlements will tend to undermine.104 And if the damages 
set by the legal system already overstate the actual costs of the 
underlying managerial conduct—as is likely the case in securities class 
actions105—then excessive settlements will only exacerbate the 
problem. 
While the actual plaintiffs in shareholder litigation do not 
generally benefit from excessive settlements, the same cannot be said 
 
negotiations to the primary insurer also seek indemnification from the primary insurer for its 
liability to the policyholder under the duty to settle? According to Professor Keeton, that 
question is a “close” one, raising doubts about whether the excess insurer in our hypothetical 
would be willing to run that chance. Keeton, supra note 43, at 1151.  
 104. The overdeterrence hazard is blunted to the extent that D&O insurers fail to adjust 
premiums for firm-specific risk. See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 77–84. 
 105. See Amanda Rose & Richard Squire, Intraportfolio Litigation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
1679, 1702 (2011) (arguing that damages in fraud-on-the-market class actions overstate the net 
social costs of the fraud). 
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for their attorneys, who are paid on contingency.106 This boon for 
plaintiffs’ attorneys comes at the expense of social wealth, as it 
encourages the filing of marginal lawsuits that the attorneys deem 
worthwhile only because of the possibility of an excessive settlement. 
The costs of these suits are like a tax on shareholder returns and 
hence discourage capital formation. 
Importantly, the duty to settle does not produce a plaintiff-
overcompensation hazard analogous to that caused by the duty to 
contribute. If an insurer believes that a within-limit settlement 
demand is greater than the expected damages plus any trial expenses 
the insurer would bear, then the insurer is better off rejecting the 
demand and going to trial, even if by doing so it breaches the duty to 
settle and hence forfeits its policy limit.107 This is the duty to settle’s 
self-regulating virtue mentioned earlier: the fact that the duty, even 
when not subject to a reasonableness standard, cannot be used to 
force an insurer to settle for more than the insurer’s estimate of the 
lawsuit’s value. 
As the hypothetical lawsuit summarized in Table 2 illustrates, the 
duty to contribute does not share this virtue. Thus, whatever the 
merits of applying a strict-liability rule to the duty to settle, the 
analysis here shows that applying the same rule to the duty to 
contribute would be a mistake. Insurers who refuse to participate in 
above-limit settlements need some means for vindication, as 
otherwise excess insurers or policyholders will collude with plaintiffs 
to force the dissenting insurers to pay for settlements that 
overcompensate the plaintiffs and hence are socially inefficient. 
Fortunately, some duty-to-contribute precedent holds that the duty is 
breached only if the settlement amount was reasonable.108 But this 
solution is hardly ideal: enforcing this standard requires follow-up 
litigation over the reasonableness of settlement amounts, which 
 
 106. Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench: Judging Fiduciaries 
and Fiduciary Judging, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1251; Jeffrey Michael Smith, The Role of the 
Attorney in Protecting (and Impairing) Shareholder Interests: Incentives and Disincentives To 
Maximize Corporate Wealth, 47 DUKE L.J. 161, 167 n.44 (1997). 
 107. An exception occurs where the insurer is responsible for the defense’s trial costs and 
those costs are greater than the difference between the settlement demand and the expected 
damages. For example, if the expected damages are $1.5M, the defense’s trial expenses are 
$0.3M, and the plaintiff demands $1.7M, it would be cheaper for the insurer to accept the 
demand than to go to trial. 
 108. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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besides being costly may often be distorted by a pro-settlement bias 
among courts that makes overcompensation more likely. 
B. Insurer Underspecialization 
The previous section described what is probably the most 
important distortion produced by the duty to contribute: a wealth 
transfer that biases settlements toward plaintiff overcompensation. 
But there is a second distortion produced by that duty, and by the 
duty to settle as well, which is the compression of settlement burdens 
on primary insurers in a manner that may interfere with insurer 
specialization. 
As a general matter, shareholder lawsuits that present 
meaningful liability risks can be divided into two types: high-merit 
suits that the plaintiff has a high probability of winning at trial, and 
long-shot suits that the plaintiff has a low probability of winning but 
that entail high potential damages. By developing expertise in 
covering one lawsuit type or the other, insurers might be able to 
appraise risk more accurately, thereby permitting them to operate 
with smaller loss reserves. And this reduction in the insurers’ 
operating costs would, in turn, lead them to charge lower premiums.109 
But the duties to settle and contribute impede such specialization 
because they force insurers on lower stories of an insurance tower to 
bear most of the burden from both types of lawsuit. 
Insurance towers already seem to reflect a degree of insurer 
specialization, as there are several D&O insurers that sell excess 
policies only.110 These insurers presumably have developed a measure 
of expertise in pricing the risk of lawsuits with high expected 
damages. Without the duties to settle and contribute, however, the 
opportunity for specialization would be greater. To see why, imagine 
a corporation with a D&O tower that consists of a $2M primary 
policy, a $3M first-layer excess policy, and a $5M second-layer excess 
policy. Imagine further that the corporation faces the risk of a long-
shot suit with $10M in potential damages and a 10 percent probability 
of a verdict for the plaintiff. At first glance, the risk of this type of 
lawsuit seems to be the reason for the second-layer excess policy. But 
 
 109. See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 79 (noting that insurers which fail to assess 
policy risks accurately will have higher risk-related expenses).  
 110. Although many companies sell excess D&O policies, the market for primary policies is 
dominated by just two, AIG and Chubb. Id. at 53. 
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note that the actuarially fair settlement amount is only $1M,111 well 
within the primary policy limit. And the duty to settle would require 
the primary insurer to accept a settlement demand of $1M even 
though the primary insurer’s expected trial liability is only $0.2M, 
excluding defense costs.112 Similarly, if the probability of a verdict for 
the plaintiff were 30 percent rather than 10 percent, the primary 
insurer would still bear the bulk of the settlement burden via the duty 
to contribute.113 In either case, the lawsuit’s settlement burden is 
concentrated on the primary insurer even though the potential 
damages reach the top of the tower. 
This example suggests that insurance towers entail a large 
amount of risk compression. Because of the duties to settle and 
contribute, lower-story insurers bear most of the risk from both high-
merit lawsuits and long-shot lawsuits. For this reason, towers might be 
conceptualized as having a pyramidal shape, with wide bases and 
progressively thinner upper floors. As will be described in Part III.B, 
risk compression would be eliminated if settlements were segmented, 
which would shift much of the settlement burden of long-shot lawsuits 
up the tower to the excess insurers.114 
C. Overspending on Defense Lawyers 
As was observed in Part I.B, there is a third legal device that 
works against the structural disincentive of lower-level insurers to 
settle: the bundling of coverage for liability with coverage for defense 
costs.115 But bundling also encourages overspending on defense 
lawyers because of the moral hazard that arises when the parties who 
hire the lawyers—namely, the manager-defendants—are not the 
parties paying them. Defense costs are a significant portion of the 
financial burden imposed by shareholder litigation: Professors Baker 
and Griffith estimate that defense costs in the typical shareholder suit 
 
 111. 10% (the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff) x $10M (the damages award if the 
plaintiff prevails) = $1M. 
 112. 10% (the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff) x $2M (the policy limit) = $0.2M. 
 113. If the potential damages remained $10M but the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff 
were 30 percent, then the primary insurer’s expected trial liability would be only $0.6M, equal to 
30% (the chances of a verdict for the plaintiff) x $2M (the policy limit). But the actuarially fair 
settlement amount would then be $3M, of which $2M would likely be the primary insurer’s 
responsibility if the case settled and the excess insurers were able to use the duty to contribute 
to force the primary insurer to pay its full policy amount. 
 114. Note that, in the lawsuit summarized in Table 2, segmenting the settlement process 
would shift $1M in expected liability from the primary insurer to the excess insurer. 
 115. See supra Part I.B. 
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equal about 30 percent of the settlement amount.116 And even when a 
case is dismissed rather than settled, the defendants may have to incur 
large legal bills to achieve that result.117 
Besides explaining bundling, the conflict of interests created by 
collective settlements also helps explain why D&O insurance appears 
to rely less than other types of liability insurance on deductibles and 
co-payments. These features of insurance policies reduce moral 
hazard by causing policyholders to bear more of the costs of their 
decisions that result in covered losses.118 In the D&O context, they 
could be used to discourage managers from overspending on defense 
lawyers. And, indeed, when D&O policies do employ these incentive-
correction devices, corporate managers tend to spend much less on 
their own defenses.119 But these curatives are often not used, at least 
at effective levels.120 Instead, the main way that D&O insurers seem to 
protect themselves against overspending on defense attorneys is 
simply to charge higher premiums. The implication is that the 
corporate managers who buy D&O insurance think that encouraging 
insurers to accept plaintiff settlement demands is more important 
than keeping insurance premiums down. 
To be sure, liability coverage creates moral hazard as well, as it 
weakens managers’ incentive to avoid the types of conduct that result 
in shareholder lawsuits. But this moral hazard is more attenuated due 
to the delay between the conduct and the lawsuit and because even 
the most scrupulous managers cannot eliminate their risk of being 
sued altogether. These observations imply that defense coverage and 
liability coverage should have different structures. But instead they 
are typically merged under a single D&O policy and subject to the 
same deductible, if any. Were it not for lower-level insurers’ 
structural disincentive to settle, this degree of bundling would be 
unnecessary and overall defense costs would be lower. 
 
 116. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 134–35. 
 117. Although defense costs are not true fixed costs, they are less variable than the potential 
damages in shareholder lawsuits, making insurance for them less economically valuable as a 
risk-spreading device.  Thus, Professors Baker and Griffith find that the ratio of a lawsuit’s 
defense costs to its settlement amount tends to fall as the settlement amount rises. Id. 
 118. Jacob Loshin, Note, Insurance Law’s Hapless Busybody: A Case Against the Insurable 
Interest Requirement, 117 YALE L.J. 474, 506 (2007). 
 119. For a vivid description of how defendants in shareholder lawsuits behave differently 
depending on whether an insurer is covering their legal bills, see BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra 
note 1, at 135–36.  
 120. Id. 
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The fact that the manager-defendants rather than the insurers 
control the defense of the typical shareholder lawsuit also helps 
explain a second unusual structural feature of D&O insurance. In 
most automobile and homeowners policies, the policy limit applies to 
liability coverage only. Defense coverage is unlimited,121 which makes 
sense given that the insurer rather than the policyholder controls the 
defense and hence is unlikely to spend more on defense attorneys 
than is justified by the expected damages.122 The typical D&O policy, 
by contrast, is a “burning candle” arrangement in which defense costs 
and liability costs count cumulatively toward the same policy limit.123 
In a liability-insurance market in which buyers want defense coverage 
but also want to control their defenses, using the policy limit to cap 
coverage for defense costs may be the insurers’ only practical means 
of reining in spending on defense lawyers. 
III.  ELIMINATING THE STRUCTURAL CONFLICT THROUGH 
SEGMENTED SETTLEMENTS 
The last Part described the distortions caused by the three 
devices that have been developed to encourage settlements by 
insurers. These distortions occur because the devices fail to correct 
the defense-side conflict of interests at its source, which is the 
mismatch between settlement liabilities and expected trial liabilities 
that arises when the trial outcome is uncertain and settlements are 
collective. As long as that mismatch persists, defense-side parties will 
have an incentive to reduce their liability by shifting losses onto each 
other rather than by pursuing settlements that minimize the total 
costs of a lawsuit. Only the duty to settle comes close to correcting the 
mismatch, but it does so by selectively disregarding policy limits.124 
And policy limits serve valuable functions such as protecting insurers 
against risks that are too large for them to bear in a cost-effective 
 
 121. See, e.g., INS. SERVS. INC., HOMEOWNERS 3 (SPECIAL FORM), app. A at 16 (1999), 
available at http://wps.aw.com/wps/media/objects/3808/3900110/appendices/AppendixA.pdf 
(capping coverage for personal liability but assuming an uncapped duty to defend); ISO PROPS., 
INC., PERSONAL AUTO POLICY, app. B at 2 (2003), available at http://wps.aw.com/wps/
media/objects/3808/3900110/appendices/AppendixB.pdf (same).  
 122. Interestingly, the moral hazard here goes the other way: the insurer bears damages 
liability only up to the policy limit, and thus faces an incentive to underinvest in defending cases 
in which the potential damages exceed that limit. 
 123. In re Enivid, Inc., 364 B.R. 139, 143–44 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007); In re Metro. Mortg. & 
Sec. Co., 325 B.R. 851, 853 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005). 
 124. See supra Part I.C.1. 
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manner. Meanwhile, the duty to contribute exacerbates incentives for 
strategic behavior by forcing insurers to pay into settlements that 
were negotiated between the plaintiff and another insurer or the 
defendant. Finally, bundling defense coverage with liability coverage 
substitutes one externalization problem for another: by curbing the 
insurer’s power to shift liability for damages onto the defendant, it 
encourages overspending on lawyers by permitting the defendant to 
shift defense costs to the insurer. 
This Part describes how segmented settlements would remove 
the defense-side structural conflict of interests, thus mitigating or 
eliminating each of the distortions that arise when settlements are 
collective. Segmented settlements would supersede the duties to 
settle and contribute, and they would reduce the need to bundle 
defense coverage with liability coverage. Segmentation is also more 
efficient than other settlement approaches that scholars have 
discussed, including a strict-liability rule for the duty to settle and 
“vertically” sliced insurance towers. 
A. The Mechanics of Segmented Settlements 
Under the prevailing method for structuring D&O coverage, a 
range of potential damages in shareholder lawsuits is divided into 
segments, and each segment is contractually assigned to a different 
insurer. Any damages beyond that range are by default the 
responsibility of the defendants, whose potential liability also forms a 
segment capped at the amount of the defendants’ wealth. Under the 
collective approach to settlements, no settlement can be reached 
unless all of the implicated defense-side parties either consent or are 
forced to contribute. Under a segmented approach, by contrast, each 
defense-side party would have the authority to settle its own liability 
segment with the plaintiff, and in doing so would neither require 
permission from other defense-side parties nor be able to force them 
to participate. 
To see how the segmented approach would work, consider again 
the lawsuit summarized in Table 1, in which the plaintiff’s probability 
of winning at trial is 50 percent, the potential damages are $3M, and 
the defendant has a $2M primary policy and a $3M excess policy. 
Recall that the lawsuit’s expected damages are $1.5M, which given 
the policy limits break down into expected trial liability of $1M for 
the primary insurer, $0.5M for the excess insurer, and zero for the 
defendant. Under a segmented approach, the plaintiff would make 
separate settlement demands to each defense-side party, presumably 
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based on their respective expected trial liabilities. If only the primary 
insurer settled, trial would occur, and a verdict for the plaintiff would 
entitle him to collect only those awarded damages in excess of the 
$2M primary limit. The first $2M in damages would be uncollectable, 
as the plaintiff would have waived his right to collect these in 
exchange for whatever settlement payment he received from the 
primary insurer.125 Conversely, if only the excess insurer settled, trial 
again would occur, but the plaintiff would be able to collect only the 
first $2M of the damages award, to be paid by the primary insurer.126 
The additional $1M in potential damages would be uncollectable, as 
the plaintiff in settling with the excess insurer would have waived his 
right to collect any awarded damages that fell within the excess 
insurer’s segment of the tower. If both insurers settled, the only 
remaining defense-side party would be the defendant, but on these 
assumptions the plaintiff has no reason to go to trial against the 
defendant alone since the potential damages do not reach the 
defendant’s liability segment. The defendant and plaintiff would thus 
have found it to be in their mutual interest to settle the defendant’s 
liability segment early in the case for no payment or perhaps a 
nominal amount. 
Note that the actuarially fair total settlement amount for this 
case remains $1.5M. What has changed is the distribution of that 
amount among the defense-side parties. Now there is no mechanism 
by which one defense-side party can, by rejecting an actuarially fair 
settlement offer, expose other defense-side parties to the risk of a 
damages award at trial. As a result, there is no longer a difference 
between the distribution of the expected trial liability and the 
distribution of the settlement burden. The structural conflict of 
interests is eliminated: the primary insurer is no longer 
undermotivated to settle before trial, and the excess insurer is no 
longer overeager to do so. The justification for the duties to settle and 
 
 125. Importantly, the size of the waiver would be the amount of the settling insurer’s policy, 
not the amount of the settlement payment. Otherwise, the segmented approach could produce 
its own plaintiff-overcompensation hazard analogous to that which arises in settlements 
involving defendants with joint and several liability.  See Kathryn E. Spier, A Note on Joint and 
Several Liability: Insolvency, Settlement, and Incentives, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 559, 562 (1994) 
(describing how a plaintiff can extract total settlement payments that exceed the expected 
damages when settling with multiple defendants whose liability is joint and several, as long as 
the plaintiff’s probability of prevailing at trial is less than 100 percent). 
 126. As under current practice, the jury would have no knowledge of the insurance 
arrangement, FED. R. EVID. 411, or of prior settlements, id. 410. 
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contribute—both of which counteract the structural bias of lower-
level insurers against settling—has been eliminated.127 
In the absence of judicial resistance, the possibility of which is 
discussed Part IV.A, settlements could be segmented contractually. 
Liability policies would specify that the insurer and policyholder are 
permitted to settle separately, subject to the condition that the insurer 
can settle only if the plaintiff agrees to waive his right to collect from 
the policyholder any damages that would be covered by that insurer’s 
policy. The policyholder and the other liability insurers would be 
third-party beneficiaries of this waiver and hence able to enforce it. 
As for coverage for defense costs, segmented settlements are 
compatible with bundled D&O policies as they are now written. If 
settlements were segmented and defense and liability coverage 
continued to be linked, insurance policies presumably would specify 
that an insurer that settles its own liability segment has no continuing 
obligation to cover defense costs either. This would be the sensible 
rule, as it would make defense-side parties who hold out internalize 
the trial costs that result from their refusal to settle. There is, 
however, no reason to assume a static liability-insurance market: 
segmenting settlements would almost certainly cause at least a partial 
decoupling of defense coverage from liability coverage, as is 
described in the next section. 
B. Segmentation’s Economic Benefits 
The segmented approach to settlements is superior to the 
conflict-control devices now in use because it respects policy limits 
while removing the structural conflict that those limits introduce 
when settlements are collective. One clear benefit of the segmented 
approach would be the elimination of the systematic plaintiff-
overcompensation hazard caused by the duty to contribute. That duty 
would lose its justification and hence would be discarded. As an 
illustration, consider again the hypothetical lawsuit summarized in 
Table 2, in which the potential damages are $5M, the plaintiff has a 50 
percent chance of winning at trial, and the defendant has a $2M 
primary policy and a $3M excess policy. As in Part II.A, we will 
consider what happens when the plaintiff makes an aggressive 
 
 127. Deductibles could also be accommodated without complication. If, for example, the 
primary policy had a deductible, then the defendant would be responsible for both the 
bottommost and topmost liability slices in the tower, which it could negotiate to settle 
separately or as a package. 
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settlement demand of $3M. Putting aside for a moment the question 
of trial costs, a risk-neutral uninsured defendant would reject that 
demand because the expected damages are only $2.5M. But because 
the excess insurer faces expected trial liability of $1.5M, it prefers a 
$3M settlement to trial as long as it can use the duty to contribute to 
force the primary insurer to tender its policy amount of $2M. If 
settlements were segmented, however, this outcome could no longer 
occur. The plaintiff would have no hope of collecting $3M in total 
settlement money, as the primary insurer would not settle for more 
than $1M (its expected trial liability), the excess insurer would not 
settle for more than $1.5M (its own expected trial liability), and there 
would be neither an incentive nor a mechanism for one insurer to 
force the other to pay more. 
Once trial expenses are factored in, the possibility arises that the 
defense-side parties in combination might be willing to settle for more 
than the total expected damages to avoid trial. But settling avoids 
trial expenses for the plaintiff as well, which means that he may be 
willing to settle for less than the expected damages. The fact that the 
common desire to avoid trial expenses creates a range of possible 
settlement amounts remains true regardless of whether the settlement 
approach is collective or segmented. The relevant point here is that 
the collective approach shifts that range upward—that is, in favor of 
the plaintiff—by the amount of the wealth transfer produced by the 
cramdown effect of the duty to contribute.128 Segmented settlements 
eliminate that shift, lowering the settlement range so that it centers 
around the expected damages, as is true in the absence of liability 
insurance.129 
By eliminating the systematic plaintiff-overcompensation hazard 
caused by the duty to contribute, segmentation not only would reduce 
total settlement amounts, but it also would weaken the incentive for 
plaintiffs to bring lawsuits of marginal merit. Total litigation costs 
would fall for the additional reason that there would no longer be 
follow-up suits over the reasonableness of rejected settlement 
demands. This last benefit is enhanced by the fact that segmented 
settlements would also eliminate the need for the duty to settle, which 
under current law is similarly subject to a reasonableness standard.130 
 
 128. A simple model that depicts this shift is provided in the Appendix. 
 129. See Spier, supra note 125, at 561 (modeling settlement negotiations in the absence of 
insurance). 
 130. See supra Part I.C.1. 
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Each of these changes would reduce the cost of D&O insurance, to 
the ultimate benefit of shareholders. 
A possible concern with the segmented approach described here 
is that it would redistribute liability up the insurance tower, seemingly 
increasing liability for policyholders. This possibility can be seen in 
the previous example if we assume there is no excess insurer; in that 
case, the defendant’s share of an actuarially fair settlement is $0.5M 
under current practice but $1.5M under the segmented approach. 
Such a liability shift seems to undermine the economic function of 
insurance, which is to transfer risk from a policyholder to an insurer 
that through diversification can bear the risk more easily.131 But this 
analysis ignores how parties would respond contractually to a change 
in the settlement rules. If segmented settlements became the norm, 
policyholders would adapt by erecting higher insurance towers, which 
they could afford to do because segmentation would eliminate risk 
compression and hence make the policies toward the bottom of the 
tower cheaper. Note how segmentation reduces the primary insurer’s 
settlement liability in the previous hypothetical from $2M to $1M. 
The primary insurer would respond to the reduction in its expected 
liability by charging a lower premium, and the policyholder could use 
the savings to raise the limit on that policy or to buy another excess 
policy. In general terms, segmented settlements would make the 
bases of insurance towers “thinner,” as lower stories would bear less 
weight from potential damages at higher levels. And this change 
would, in turn, allow towers to be taller without making them more 
expensive to construct. 
Eliminating risk compression would also promote insurer 
specialization and thereby allow for more accurate pricing of 
litigation risk. As noted in Part II.B, collective settlements conflate 
insurance coverage for two distinct types of lawsuit: high-merit suits 
that the plaintiff would be likely win at trial, and long-shot suits that 
the plaintiff would be less likely to win but that have high potential 
damages. The duties to settle and contribute concentrate the 
settlement burden of both lawsuit types on lower-story insurers. 
Segmented settlements would shift much of the settlement burden of 
the long-shot lawsuits up the tower. And this shift in settlement 
burdens would encourage specialization by producing greater 
separation between the settlement burden from suits with low 
potential damages, which would continue to be focused on lower-
 
 131. POSNER, supra note 34, at 131. 
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level insurers, and the burden from long-shot suits with high potential 
damages, which would be more concentrated on the excess insurers 
on upper floors. 
A further benefit of segmented settlements is that they would 
reduce spending on defense lawyers by decreasing the need to bundle 
defense coverage with liability coverage as a mechanism for 
overcoming lower-level insurers’ structural disincentive to settle. As 
was described in Part II.C, bundling encourages overspending on 
lawyers due to the moral hazard that arises when the corporate 
managers run their defense but their insurers pay for it. If lower-level 
insurers’ bias against settling were eliminated, defense coverage could 
make more aggressive use of deductibles, copayments, and other 
devices for managing the overspending hazard. The net result would 
be lower overall defense costs and hence, through lower premiums, 
higher profits for shareholders. 
There is one scenario in which full bundling would probably 
persist: when the corporation and its managers have settled out of the 
lawsuit but at least one insurer has declined settlement and opted for 
trial. We can predict that liability policies would be written so that the 
nonsettling insurers in such cases bore the defense’s trial expenses 
without regard to policy limits,132 as otherwise those insurers could 
externalize onto other defense-side parties some of the costs of their 
refusal to settle.133 Notably, as each insurer settles out of the case, the 
burden of the trial expenses would be increasingly focused on the 
remaining insurers, thereby strengthening their incentives to settle as 
well. This dynamic is the opposite of the typical holdout problem, in 
which each party who joins the collective resolution strengthens the 
bargaining position of the holdouts who remain.134 Moreover, each 
separate settlement would also increase the plaintiff’s incentive to 
 
 132. The policyholders presumably would still control the defenses in such cases, thus 
avoiding the conflict of interests that would arise from coverage exclusions if the insurers were 
in charge. For this reason, the moral hazard that encourages overspending on defense attorneys 
would persist, albeit in a more limited context. Strictly speaking, this particular social cost of 
D&O insurance does not result from the structural conflict that segmented settlements would 
eliminate, as it would occur even if liability policies had no limits. Rather, this cost is a 
byproduct of the insistence by insured defendants on running their own defenses in shareholder 
lawsuits.  
 133. If multiple insurers remained in the case, the allocation rule might be that the litigation 
expenses would all fall on one insurer—perhaps the lowest-ranked insurer in the tower that 
remains. Such a rule would maximize that insurer’s incentive to settle, which would then shift 
the expected trial liability to the next insurer, and so on.  
 134. For a general description of holdout dynamics, see Cohen, supra note 86, at 354–59. 
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settle with remaining defense-side parties, as each settlement would 
reduce the amount the plaintiff could win at trial but not his likely 
trial expenses. 
C. Other Reform Proposals: Strict Liability and Vertically Sliced 
Towers 
Two other approaches to alleviating insurer-policyholder conflict 
have been discussed by scholars. Neither, however, fully eliminates 
the source of that conflict, and thus neither would go as far as the 
segmented approach in reducing the costs of the current system. The 
first approach has already been mentioned: converting the duty to 
settle into a strict-liability rule under which an insurer automatically 
forfeits its policy limit whenever it rejects a within-limit settlement 
demand, regardless of the demand’s reasonableness.135 This proposal’s 
main virtue is that it would reduce the need for follow-up lawsuits 
between insurers and policyholders, which besides generating direct 
litigation costs present a risk of legal error.136 But the proposal has an 
overlooked downside, which is that it would increase risk 
compression on primary insurers and hence further undermine 
insurer specialization.137 Moreover, as long as settlements remain 
collective, a reasonableness standard will still be needed in duty-to-
contribute cases in order to police the plaintiff-overcompensation 
hazard. For these reasons, making the duty to settle a strict-liability 
rule would not be as efficient as segmented settlements, which 
remove the structural conflict that makes such a duty necessary in the 
first place. 
A second approach to liability insurance, which is used in 
Europe, is called the “quota share” system.138 Insurance towers are 
sliced vertically rather than horizontally, meaning that each 
participating insurer, instead of assuming all liability within its 
exclusive segment of the liability range, accepts a percentage of the 
liability range covered by the tower as a whole. For example, four 
liability insurers might agree with a policyholder that each insurer will 
cover 25 percent of the liability and defense costs, up to a common 
limit of $10M per lawsuit. The main apparent advantage of this 
approach is that, among the insurers themselves, there is no longer a 
 
 135. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 136. See supra notes 64–69 and accompanying text. 
 137. See supra Part II.B. 
 138. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 148. 
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structural difference between the distribution of the expected trial 
liability and the distribution of the settlement burden.139 Hence, there 
is no opportunity for insurers to engage in cramdown settlements that 
create a plaintiff-overcompensation hazard. In this way, the quota 
share system seems to mark an improvement over horizontally sliced 
towers. And this very lack of a cramdown dynamic among insurers 
gives managers of corporations in the United States an incentive to 
resist the quota share system, for reasons discussed in Part IV. 
The quota share system only partly removes the cramdown 
dynamic, however, because it does not eliminate the structural 
conflict of interests between the insurers as a group and the 
defendants sitting atop the tower. The division in the tower between 
these two groups is still horizontal, as it is in American-style towers. 
Therefore, duties to settle and contribute, running from the insurers 
as a group to the policyholders, would still be necessary. And the 
need for a duty to contribute, in turn, implies the possibility of 
cramdown settlements negotiated directly between defendants and 
plaintiffs. 
Another drawback of the quota share system is that it apparently 
requires all insurers to consent to a settlement in order to be bound 
by it. The system thus may suffer from collective-action problems 
such as holdouts. And a third drawback is that there is less 
opportunity for insurer specialization because all insurers bear 
equally the risks of different types of lawsuit. For these reasons, it is 
not obvious that the quota share system marks a significant 
improvement over towers that are sliced horizontally. It is 
nonetheless worth noting that a segmented approach to settlements is 
also compatible with the quota share system and would mitigate its 
apparent collective-action problems. If each insurer in a vertically 
sliced tower could settle separately with the plaintiff, holdouts would 
not be able to force trial on other insurers who would rather settle. 
Segmented settlements in this context mean that each insurer could 
make a payment to the plaintiff in exchange for a waiver of the 
plaintiff’s right to collect the percentage of the damages within the 
tower covered by that insurer. 
 
 139. Id. 
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IV.  REFORM OBSTACLES: OLD-FASHIONED JUDGES AND PROFIT-
SMOOTHING MANAGERS 
This Article has argued that segmented settlements are superior 
not only to the collective approach now in use but also to the 
alternatives that other scholars have considered. But if the segmented 
approach really is more efficient, why has it not been adopted 
already? Two potential obstacles to reform seem most likely. The first 
is judges who might think that the approach is inconsistent with 
insurers’ traditional “duty to defend.” The second, and probably 
more important, potential reform obstacle is corporate managers. 
While collective settlements reduce shareholder profits, they serve 
managerial interests by increasing the likelihood that settlement 
payments will be fully covered by D&O insurance, thereby shielding 
reported corporate earnings—and managers’ incentive-based pay—
from the impact of shareholder lawsuits brought in response to the 
managers’ conduct. If settlements were segmented, a larger 
proportion of settlements would be paid by corporations rather than 
their insurers, thereby increasing the volatility of reported corporate 
earnings and reducing the managers’ reputations and compensation. 
There are two situations in which the collective approach is 
especially likely to advance managers’ interests. Both involve the use 
of the duty to contribute to overcome insurer resistance to settlement. 
The first is when the plaintiff thinks that the expected damages are 
significantly higher than the D&O insurers do. And the second is 
when there is a good chance that a coverage exclusion would be 
triggered if the case went to trial. In both situations, the duty to 
contribute’s cramdown effect can help bring about a covered 
settlement. And the potential for a cramdown settlement increases 
with the number of policies in the tower, encouraging managers to 
divide coverage among more insurers than they would otherwise. 
Segmented settlements would supersede the duty to contribute and 
hence eliminate this incentive to overdivide coverage. 
A. Judicial Conservatism and the Duty To Defend 
Considering the judicial obstacle first, some courts might 
consider it an act of bad faith for a liability insurer to enter into a 
settlement that does not include a full release for the policyholder. 
Under the segmented approach, an insurer could settle in exchange 
for a release that extends only to damages covered by the policy. The 
basis for such judicial resistance would be the common law’s duty to 
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defend, under which a liability insurer must represent its 
policyholder’s best interests both in court and in negotiations with 
plaintiffs.140 A judge who is mindful of this duty might be sympathetic 
to a policyholder who complained that her insurer abandoned her by 
settling out of the case, notwithstanding that the insurer obtained a 
liability waiver from the plaintiff up to the policy limit. 
Judicial resistance to segmented settlements would probably be 
strongest in the context of traditional liability insurance such as 
automobile and homeowners coverage. People buy such insurance 
not only to shield their wealth but also to enlist a litigation expert 
who can choose a lawyer for them and manage their defenses. This is 
why automobile and homeowners policies assign both the right and 
the duty to defend to the insurer, giving the policyholder the benefit 
of the insurer’s expertise throughout the litigation. It is also why 
many courts hold that an insurer acts in bad faith if it asks its 
policyholder to contribute to a settlement unless the insurer is also 
tendering its full policy amount.141 Such a request implies a 
negotiation between the insurer and policyholder over the division of 
the settlement burden, a negotiation in which the asymmetry of 
expertise presumably puts the policyholder at a disadvantage. 
With D&O insurance, however, the relationship between insurer 
and policyholder is quite different. The corporate managers covered 
by D&O insurance usually have experience with litigation and are 
likely to retain control over their own defenses. For this reason, most 
D&O policies explicitly abrogate the insurer’s duty to defend, and 
they require the policyholder to consult with the insurer before 
settling so that the insurer is not left out of settlement negotiations 
altogether. In this context, the policyholder has paid only for an 
underwriter, and so there is no reason for courts to force the insurer 
to serve as a fiduciary as well. 
A second judicial concern with segmented settlements has arisen 
in what might be called “sandwich” settlements, which occur when 
both the primary insurer and the defendant settle but an excess 
insurer remains in the case. Sandwich settlements are the only type of 
segmented settlement that seems to have been attempted with any 
frequency, perhaps because they include a full release for the 
defendant and hence create no liability risk to the primary insurer 
under the duty to defend. But some courts have blocked sandwich 
 
 140. See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 171 (Cal. 1966). 
 141. See Syverud, supra note 43, at 1155–56. 
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settlements on different grounds, namely that a trial involving only 
the plaintiff and an excess insurer would be a “sham” because the 
nominal defendant (the policyholder) no longer has any liability 
exposure. In the 1978 case United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Lay,142 
the Seventh Circuit cited this concern in holding that a sandwich 
settlement also extinguished the excess insurer’s liability even though 
the excess insurer was not a party to the settlement agreement.143 
The Lay court’s concern about sham lawsuits is unconvincing, as 
it seemingly would require that all liability policies have limits so that 
policyholders always have residual exposure. Few courts would agree 
that a liability policy must have a limit to be enforceable at all. 
Unsurprisingly, most courts that have considered sandwich 
settlements have rejected Lay’s reasoning.144 
In recent years, however, excess insurers have mounted 
successful objections to sandwich settlements on purely contractual 
grounds.145 This trend seems to be the result of more careful drafting, 
with excess policies now specifying that coverage begins only when 
the primary insurer has actually paid out its full policy amount. 
Earlier policies could be interpreted to permit liability for the excess 
insurer when the primary policy was merely “exhausted.”146 Since 
settling is advantageous to the primary insurer only if it can do so for 
less than its policy limit, this more explicit wording makes sandwich 
settlements infeasible. 
The fact that insurers are drafting excess policies to preclude a 
particular type of segmented settlement implies that the judiciary is 
not the only obstacle to reform. The buyers of corporate liability 
insurance, who otherwise would penalize insurers for inserting 
inefficient clauses into policies, seem not to want segmented 
settlements either. When it comes to D&O insurance, the buyers are, 
of course, the corporate managers who often are sued in shareholder 
 
 142. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lay, 577 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1978). 
 143. Id. at 423. 
 144. Decisions upholding such settlements include Zeig v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 23 F.2d 
665 (2d Cir. 1928); Kelley Co. v. Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 662 F. Supp. 1284 (E.D. Wis. 
1987); Siligato v. Welch, 607 F. Supp. 743 (D. Conn. 1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Riverside Ins. 
Co., 509 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Drake v. Ryan, 498 N.W.2d 29 (Minn. 1993); Loy v. 
Bunderson, 320 N.W.2d 175 (Wis. 1982). 
 145. E.g., Comerica Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 498 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1034 (E.D. Mich. 
2007); Qualcomm Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 786 
(Ct. App. 2008). 
 146. Zeig, 23 F.2d at 666; see also Qualcomm, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 786 (collecting cases). 
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lawsuits. Why would managers resist an approach to settlements that, 
as is argued here, would increase corporate profits? 
B. Collective Settlements as Reputation and Compensation Shields 
A commonplace among corporate-law commentators is that 
managers’ top priority in shareholder lawsuits is avoiding trial.147 Trial 
can bring to light unflattering information about the managers’ 
performance, and it threatens their personal wealth because a judicial 
finding of deliberate misconduct would preclude both insurance 
coverage and indemnification by the corporation. Managers therefore 
will prefer settling even some cases in which shareholder interests 
would be better served by a trial. 
Although the risks to managers from trial explain why essentially 
all shareholder lawsuits that are not dismissed are settled, they do not 
explain why corporate managers cause their firms to purchase as 
much D&O coverage as they do. Even without insurance, managers 
could pay to settle shareholder lawsuits pre-trial and then obtain 
indemnification from their corporation. D&O insurance is needed to 
protect managers’ personal wealth only in the rare lawsuit that is 
large enough to bankrupt the corporation. This implies “catastrophic” 
D&O policies with high deductibles. But D&O policies do not make 
aggressive use of deductibles,148 suggesting that corporate managers 
are averse not just to trial but also to pre-trial settlements that, if not 
covered by insurance, would put an unsightly dent in their firm’s 
reported earnings. As noted previously, the average securities class-
action settlement in recent years equaled 18 percent of the average 
quarterly earnings of Fortune 500 firms.149 Adding in the typical 
defense costs in shareholder lawsuits raises the total costs of such 
suits as a percentage of quarterly earnings to 23 percent.150 In other 
words, most of the D&O coverage that corporations purchase serves 
not to protect managers in case of their corporations’ bankruptcy, but 
rather to reduce the volatility of their corporations’ reported 
earnings. The price of this lower volatility is a reduction in the 
baseline earnings level by the amount of the insurance premiums, a 
 
 147. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 22, at 407. 
 148. See supra notes 119–120 and accompanying text.  
 149. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 150. As noted previously, defense costs typically equal about 30 percent of the settlement 
amount. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
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price that the managers who make the D&O purchase decisions are 
evidently willing to accept. 
At first blush it might seem that risk-averse shareholders would 
benefit from the reduction in earnings volatility that D&O insurance 
provides. But this perception is inaccurate as applied to shareholders 
of publicly traded corporations, who can hedge firm-specific risk in 
the same way that an insurer does, namely by holding a diversified 
investment portfolio.151 In other words, the volatility of returns on a 
diversified stock portfolio is not lower when the firms in the portfolio 
own D&O insurance, a point that becomes especially clear once one 
recognizes that the D&O insurers will also likely be represented in 
the portfolio. But the overall returns on the portfolio will be lower 
due to the administrative costs of buying and selling the policies and 
running the insurance companies. A rough estimate of these costs 
suggests that they equal at least 20 percent of total insurance 
premiums.152 
While D&O insurance will not reduce the volatility of the 
returns on a diversified stock portfolio,153 it will reduce the earnings 
volatility of those individual firms whose managers are sued. It does 
this by replacing large but infrequent settlement payments with 
smaller but regular premium payments. In other words, D&O 
insurance protects earnings reports from the dip that a large 
settlement payment would otherwise cause. And managers benefit 
from litigation-proof earnings reports because investors use such 
reports to evaluate the managers’ performance, and because most 
managerial compensation is tied to the firm’s stock price and reported 
 
 151. See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 58. 
 152. The insurance industry uses the term “loading costs” to describe those expenses that 
are added to the insurer’s actual expected liability on an insurance policy to calculate the 
premium charged. Loading costs are usually between 20 and 30 percent of the total premium 
amount. Id. A portion of these costs include the necessary returns on investment for the 
insurer’s shareholders, and thus are not a true cost from the perspective of diversified 
shareholders. On the other hand, loading costs exclude the administrative expenses incurred by 
the insurance buyers, which are a true cost to diversified investors. 
 153. Even diversified shareholders might benefit from D&O insurance to the extent that it 
reduces the likelihood that portfolio firms will incur costs of financial distress such as 
bankruptcy. But, again, this concern would justify “catastrophic” coverage rather than the 
policies with lower deductibles that we actually observe. Professors Baker and Griffith have 
considered other potential benefits to diversified shareholders of D&O insurance, such as tax 
savings, but they have concluded that none of these are convincing either. Id. at 63–68.  
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financial results.154 Although the D&O premiums themselves also 
reduce reported profits, their impact is both smaller and more 
predictable, and they may not affect managers’ compensation at all if 
they are priced into the baseline stock price or profit level used for 
issuing stock options or calculating earnings-based bonuses.155  
This discussion suggests that corporate managers actually have 
two important objectives in shareholder lawsuits: they want all suits 
that survive the motion to dismiss to be settled before trial, and they 
want the cost of the settlements to be covered entirely by insurers. 
The managers have a great deal of control over the first objective, as 
they can always choose to settle a case pre-trial and arrange for their 
corporation to pay for it. They have less control over the second 
objective, which requires the cooperation of the D&O insurers. And 
the insurers may resist paying for a settlement even when they are not 
structurally biased against settling by the collective settlement 
approach. There are two situations in which this type of insurer 
resistance to settlement is particularly likely. The first is when the 
plaintiff honestly thinks that his case is worth more than the D&O 
insurers do. And the second is when there is a good chance that trial 
would result in a finding of deliberate misconduct, triggering a 
coverage exclusion. To force insured settlements in such cases, 
managers have an incentive to structure their insurance coverage to 
maximize the likelihood of a cramdown settlement under the duty to 
contribute. In this way, managers’ interest in shielding earnings 
reports from volatility caused by shareholder litigation gives them a 
reason not only to preserve the current regime of collective 
settlements, but also to divide their D&O coverage among more 
insurers than they would otherwise. 
1. Insurer Resistance Due to Plaintiff or Insurer Overconfidence.  
When negotiating to settle a shareholder lawsuit, the most important 
factor that parties consider is the damages that would be awarded if 
the case went to trial. After conducting extensive interviews with 
 
 154. Rose & Squire, supra note 105, at 1693 (describing how corporate liability for 
managerial misconduct can provide useful information to diversified shareholders even if 
damages payments constitute mere pocket-shifting). 
 155. See Elaine Buckberg & Frederick C. Dunbar, Disgorgement: Punitive Demands and 
Remedial Offers, 63 BUS. L. REV. 347, 364 (2008) (describing a typical bonus plan using earnings 
per share as the baseline); Michael T. Higgins, A Better Approach to the Bonus Question, BUS. 
WK. ONLINE (Nov. 4, 2003), http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/nov2003/
sb2003115_9919.htm (explaining that earnings-based performance bonuses are awarded only for 
performance in excess of a baseline).  
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individuals who are regularly involved in shareholder litigation—
including defense-side and plaintiff-side lawyers, insurance 
underwriters, insurance claims managers, and corporate managers 
who purchase D&O insurance—Professors Baker and Griffith wrote: 
“Damages, our respondents insisted, drive settlements.”156 This 
description of settlement behavior in the D&O context accords with 
the standard economic model of litigation settlements, under which 
litigants’ willingness to settle is based on their estimates of the 
benefits and costs of trial.157 
In the hypotheticals this Article has used to illustrate settlement 
dynamics, the plaintiff and the defense-side parties share a common 
estimate of the expected damages. But of course such estimates can 
differ, and they can do so in ways that make settlement more or less 
likely. For example, if a liability insurer thinks that the plaintiff’s case 
is worth more than the plaintiff does, then an insurer-covered 
settlement is especially likely, for the same reason that a sale is more 
likely if the prospective buyer values the sales item more than the 
seller does. But if the plaintiff thinks his case is worth more than the 
insurers do, then the parties will be less likely to agree on a settlement 
price. 
Even, however, when a plaintiff’s estimate of the expected 
damages is greater than that of the defense-side parties, the parties’ 
common interest in avoiding trial expenses might enable them to 
reach a settlement. The trial expenses that settlement avoids can be 
seen as a “surplus” that the parties divide between themselves in the 
settlement agreement.158 If this surplus is big enough, it can bridge a 
gap between the parties’ damages estimates that would otherwise 
preclude settlement. As a simple illustration, imagine a lawsuit in 
which the plaintiff thinks that the expected damages are $1.5M, but 
the defendant thinks they are only $1M. This difference in the 
damages estimates opens up a $0.5M gap between the plaintiff’s 
minimum settlement demand and the defendant’s maximum 
settlement offer. But imagine further that the trial would cost each 
party $0.3M in litigation expenses. Now the defendant would be 
willing to offer up to $1.3M to avoid trial, while the plaintiff will be 
 
 156. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 161. 
 157. See POSNER, supra note 34, at 764–65 (noting that trial rather than settlement occurs 
when the plaintiff’s estimate of expected damages minus the defendant’s exceeds total trial 
costs).  
 158. Another motive to settle is risk-aversion, which can cause a party to favor the certainty 
of a settlement payment to the uncertainty of a trial. 
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willing to accept as little as $1.2M. The desire to avoid trial expenses 
has created a range of values—between $1.2M and $1.3M—in which 
settlement is mutually beneficial.159 Put in general terms, and 
assuming that the parties are risk-neutral,  a settlement will occur so 
long as the total expected trial expenses are greater than the 
plaintiff’s expected damages estimate minus the defendant’s.160 On the 
other hand, if the gap in estimates is greater than the surplus 
attributable to the avoidance of trial expenses, then negotiations will 
break down. 
The likelihood that the parties will differ in their estimates of the 
expected damages is particularly high in the context of shareholder 
litigation. Very few shareholder lawsuits actually go to trial, and so 
litigants must rely on indirect predictors of hypothetical damages 
awards such as investor losses and intangible factors such as how 
scandalous the managers’ behavior seems.161 Parties will naturally vary 
in their estimates of the magnitude and relevance of these factors, 
creating a high probability of honest differences in their appraisals of 
the lawsuit’s value. Although risk-aversion and avoided trial expenses 
may sometimes bridge these differences, the likelihood of a 
negotiations breakdown nonetheless seems particularly high in the 
shareholder litigation context. 
One of the most important implications of the duty to contribute 
is that it creates an additional form of surplus for the parties to a 
settlement agreement. That surplus is the value transfer that a 
cramdown settlement captures from the lower-level insurers in the 
insurance tower. And the addition of this further advantage of 
settling may be enough to bring the parties to an agreement in cases 
in which risk-aversion and avoided trial expenses are not alone 
sufficient to bridge a gap in damages estimates. Put another way, the 
wealth transfer captured by the duty to contribute raises the 
maximum settlement amount that is acceptable to the upper-level 
insurers in the tower, increasing the likelihood that this amount 
equals or exceeds the minimum amount the plaintiff is willing to 
accept. Therefore, corporate managers who want to reduce the risk 
that D&O insurers will refuse to meet a plaintiff’s settlement demand 
will subdivide coverage among multiple insurers to increase the 
likelihood that the duty to contribute is implicated. 
 
 159. The range may be wider if the parties are risk-averse.   
 160. See infra Appendix. 
 161. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 156–66.  
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As an illustration, consider a shareholder lawsuit against a 
corporate manager protected by a single, $5M D&O policy.162 Assume 
that the parties agree that the potential damages are $5M but disagree 
about the plaintiff’s chances of winning at trial: the plaintiff thinks he 
has an 80 percent chance of winning, making his estimate of the 
expected damages $4M, while the insurer thinks the plaintiff has only 
a 50 percent chance, making its estimate of the expected damages 
$2.5M. Assume further that trial expenses would be $0.5M on each 
side. On these assumptions, the plaintiff would rationally be willing to 
settle for as little as $3.5M. The insurer, in turn, would be willing to 
settle for up to $2.75. This figure represents the insurer’s estimate of 
the expected damages plus half the defense’s trial costs, since on these 
assumptions the insurer would bear trial costs only if the plaintiff 
loses.163 Thus, even with trial costs factored in, a $0.75M gap between 
the plaintiff’s minimum demand and the insurer’s maximum offer 
remains. This gap means that the manager will be able to avoid trial 
only by agreeing to a settlement that is paid by herself or her 
corporation rather than the insurer.164 
Now consider what would happen in the same hypothetical if the 
manager, instead of buying just one $5M policy, divided her coverage 
between a $2M primary policy and a $3M excess policy. In this case, 
the insurers’ estimate of the expected liability distribution is given by 
Table 2: the primary insurer believes it faces $1M in expected trial 
liability (plus $0.5M in defense costs if the defendant prevails), and 
the excess insurer believes it faces expected trial liability of $1.5M. 
Therefore, to avoid trial, the excess insurer will be willing to settle the 
case for up to $3.5M so long as it can use the duty to contribute to 
force the primary insurer to tender its policy amount of $2M. 
Because, as noted in the previous paragraph, the plaintiff is willing to 
settle for $3.5M, the possibility now exists of a pre-trial settlement 
paid by the insurers notwithstanding that they believe the plaintiff’s 
 
 162. A version of this hypothetical lawsuit using more generalized terms is provided in the 
Appendix. 
 163. Because the potential damages equal the policy limit, the insurer will disregard the 
defense’s expected trial expenses to the extent it expects the plaintiff to prevail, as these 
expenses will then be borne by the manager or her corporation. This insurer bears the defense’s 
trial expenses only if the verdict is for the defendant.  
 164. After settling the manager might try to seek reimbursement from the insurer under an 
aggressive version of the duty to contribute, which she would argue is applicable here even 
though the settlement demand was within the insurer’s policy limit. Except, however, when they 
are applying California law, courts appear to be disinclined to permit such claims. See infra 
notes 184–190 and accompanying text. 
SQUIRE IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2012  12:50 PM 
56 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1 
suit is worth significantly less than the plaintiff does. In other words, 
the $1M value transfer produced by the duty to contribute has 
increased the plaintiff’s and excess insurer’s mutual gains from 
settling by an amount large enough to bridge the difference in their 
estimates of the expected damages. 
A possible reaction to this hypothetical is that the duty to 
contribute seems to be providing a social benefit: by bridging a gap in 
expected damages estimates, the duty is making possible a settlement 
that avoids the expenses of trial. But it must be remembered that, at 
least in the context of shareholder litigation, the most likely 
consequence of a breakdown in negotiations between the liability 
insurers and the plaintiff is not a trial; it is instead a settlement that is 
paid by the defendant corporation instead of the insurers. Thus, there 
is little reason to think that the duty to contribute is actually avoiding 
trial expenses in most shareholder lawsuits. In addition, the duty to 
contribute widens the range of potential settlement amounts in an 
asymmetrical way: it increases the amount that upper-level insurers 
are willing to pay rather than lowering the amount that plaintiffs are 
willing to accept. Thus, when the duty to contribute bridges a 
difference in the parties’ estimates of the expected damages, it always 
does so by moving the settlement amount toward the plaintiff’s 
(higher) rather than the insurers’ (lower) estimate, regardless of 
which of them is mistaken about the lawsuit’s real value. Unless 
plaintiffs are never the mistaken ones, the necessary conclusion is that 
the duty to contribute biases settlement negotiations toward plaintiff 
overcompensation, thereby generating social costs such as too many 
lawsuits and pricier liability insurance. For these reasons, it would be 
a mistake to conclude that the duty to contribute, by bridging gaps 
between parties’ estimates of expected damages in shareholder 
lawsuits, is increasing social wealth rather than destroying it. 
2. Insurer Resistance Due to Coverage Exclusions.  The second 
scenario in which liability insurers are especially likely to resist a pre-
trial settlement is when there is a good chance that trial would result 
in a finding of deliberate defendant misconduct that forfeits 
coverage.165 Thus, Professors Baker and Griffith have found that when 
 
 165. See, e.g., CHUBB GRP. OF INS. COS., CHUBB FOREFRONT PORTFOLIO 3.0: DIRECTORS 
& OFFICERS AND ENTITY LIABILITY § V(A)(9)(a) (2011), available at http://www.chubb.com/
businesses/csi/chubb13760.pdf (disclaiming liability for “any deliberately fraudulent act or 
omission, or any willful violation of any statute or regulation, by an Insured”).  
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D&O insurers have a strong coverage defense—the most important 
type being the exclusion for deliberate fraud—they use it in 
settlement negotiations to reduce their liability and increase the 
portion of the settlement paid by the corporate defendant.166 
Similarly, Professors Michael Klausner and Jason Hegland have 
found that the percentage of settlement amounts paid by insurers 
rather than defendants is lower in securities actions in which a 
coverage exclusion is more likely.167 
Just as it can overcome the obstacle to settlement caused by 
differences in damages estimates, the value transfer produced by the 
duty to contribute can overcome insurer settlement resistance due to 
coverage defenses. For this reason, the risk of a coverage exclusion 
creates an additional motive for managers to increase the likelihood 
of a cramdown settlement by subdividing D&O coverage among 
multiple insurers. 
Consider again the example of a corporate manager who is 
covered by a $5M D&O policy and who faces a shareholder lawsuit 
that she and her insurer estimate has potential damages of $5M and a 
50 percent probability of a verdict for the plaintiff. To isolate the 
effect of coverage exclusions, assume for now that the plaintiff agrees 
with these estimates. Assume further that the D&O policy contains 
an exclusion for deliberate misconduct. Finally, assume all parties 
agree that, if the plaintiff wins at trial, there is a further 50 percent 
chance that the verdict will include a finding that triggers the 
exclusion. Trial thus presents three possible outcomes: a verdict for 
the defendant (50 percent chance), a damages award that is covered 
by insurance (25 percent), and a damages award that is not covered 
(25 percent).168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 166. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 197. 
 167. Klausner & Hegland, supra note 9, at 2.  
 168. Again, a version of this hypothetical lawsuit using more generalized terms is provided 
in the Appendix. 
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Table 3.Liability with Coverage Exclusion and a Single Insurer 
 Expected 
Trial Liability 
Share of 
Collective 
Settlement 
Benefit (Cost) 
of Collective 
Settlement 
Insurer,  
$5M limit 
$1.25M $2.5M ($1.25M) 
Defendant $1.25M — $1.25M 
Total $2.5M $2.5M — 
 
The lawsuit’s fair settlement value is $2.5M, well within the $5M 
policy limit. But because of the policy exclusion, the insurer’s 
expected trial liability (disregarding litigation expenses) is only 
$1.25M.169 Unless the plaintiff is willing to settle at a deep discount, 
perhaps due to risk aversion or high expected trial costs, he will not 
make a settlement demand that the insurer will accept. Thus, to 
achieve a pre-trial settlement, the manager will have to pay the 
plaintiff with her corporation’s money rather than the insurer’s.170 
Now consider what would happen in this same case if instead of 
being covered by a single $5M policy, the manager divided coverage 
between a $2M primary policy and a $3M excess policy, both of which 
contained exclusions for deliberate misconduct.171 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 169. The insurer’s expected liability of $1.25M = $5M (the potential damages) x 50% (the 
probability of a verdict for the plaintiff) x 50% (the probability that a verdict for the plaintiff 
does not trigger the exclusion).  
 170. Moreover, the manager may not be able to wield the duty to settle to force the insurer 
to pay the actuarially fair amount, as courts have held that this duty does not create liability for 
damages that would otherwise be uninsurable as a matter of public policy, such as those 
resulting from intentional wrongdoing. See, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 
P.2d 652, 658 (Cal. 1999) (enforcing a “policy of not allowing liability for intentional 
wrongdoing to be offset or reduced by the negligence of another,” including an insurer’s 
negligent failure to settle). 
 171. Alternatively she could have three or more policies providing $5M in total coverage, a 
variation that would not change the conclusions reached here.  
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Table 4. Liability with Exclusions and a Tower 
 Expected 
Trial Liability 
Share of 
Collective 
Settlement 
Benefit (Cost) 
of Collective 
Settlement 
Primary Insurer,  
$2M policy  
$0.5M $2.0M ($1.5M) 
Excess Insurer,  
$3M policy  
$0.75M $0.5M $0.25M 
Defendant $1.25M — $1.25M 
Total $2.5M $2.5M — 
 
In this case the duty to contribute comes to the manager’s rescue. 
Note that the primary insurer is deeply reluctant to settle pre-trial: its 
share of an actuarially fair settlement is $2M (i.e., its policy limit), 
while its expected trial liability is only $0.5M.172 Yet the excess insurer 
is willing to settle for the actuarially fair $2.5M assuming it can use 
the duty to contribute to transfer $2M of that cost to the primary 
insurer. That transfer leaves the excess insurer with net liability of 
$0.5M, as compared with its expected trial liability of $0.75M.173 As in 
the case of differing damages estimates, the duty to contribute has 
made an insured pre-trial settlement possible even though the 
plaintiff perceives that he has significantly more to gain from trial 
than the insurers collectively think they have to lose. 
In combination with the discussion of the duty to contribute in 
Part II.A, this analysis indicates that the duty distorts settlements in 
two ways: it increases the likelihood that plaintiffs will be 
overcompensated, and it increases the likelihood of an insurer-
covered settlement in cases in which insurance seemingly should be 
unavailable because there is a good chance that the defendant 
engaged in deliberate wrongdoing. These distortions will trade off 
against each other. For example, considering again the hypothetical 
lawsuit summarized in Table 4, the largest settlement in which the 
 
 172. $0.5M = $2M (the primary policy limit) x 50% (the probability of a verdict for the 
plaintiff) x 50% (the probability that a verdict for the plaintiff does not trigger the exclusion).  
 173. $0.75M = $3M (the portion of a $5M verdict that falls within the excess policy) x 50% 
(the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff) x 50% (the probability that a verdict for the 
plaintiff does not trigger the exclusion).  
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excess insurer would reasonably participate is $2.75M,174 only $0.25M 
higher than the fair settlement amount of $2.5M. By contrast, the 
otherwise identical lawsuit summarized in Table 2 presented a 
potential of up to $1M in plaintiff overcompensation. In general, the 
duty to contribute is more likely to result in plaintiff 
overcompensation when the probability of a coverage exclusion is 
low, and more likely to result in coverage of an otherwise uninsurable 
loss when the probability of an exclusion is high. 
To be sure, the duty to contribute’s cramdown effect will not be 
sufficient to overcome an insurer’s reluctance to settle in all cases. A 
primary insurer might not be overborne if, for example, both of the 
aforementioned sources of settlement resistance were present in the 
same case. Consider what would happen in the lawsuit summarized in 
Table 4 if the plaintiff thought that his probability of winning at trial 
were 80 percent while the insurers continued to place that probability 
at 50 percent. Now the plaintiff’s estimate of the expected damages is 
$4M, well above the $2.75M figure that Table 4 indicates is the largest 
settlement demand the excess insurer, putting aside trial expenses, 
would be willing to accept. To avoid trial in that case, the manager-
defendant will have to use the corporation’s money to pay the 
difference. Concordantly, Professors Baker and Griffith observe that 
defendant corporations sometimes contribute to shareholder 
litigation settlements even when the total settlement amount is within 
the limits of the available insurance.175 But the amount the 
corporation must pay—and hence the negative impact on reported 
earnings—still is likely to be smaller than it would be without the duty 
to contribute. Note in Table 4 that the insurers in combination will 
pay a maximum of $2.75M toward a settlement if we assume that the 
primary insurer can be forced to tender its policy amount, as 
contrasted with the maximum of $1.25M they would pay if each could 
settle separately for its expected trial liability. 
3. Segmentation’s Impact on Towers and Profit Reports.  The 
foregoing discussion suggests that one of the primary benefits to 
corporate managers of insurance towers is the smoothing of reported 
corporate earnings. But towers provide this benefit only because 
 
 174. As Table 4 reflects, the excess insurer’s expected trial liability is $0.75M. Therefore, 
assuming it can obtain a $2M contribution from the primary insurer, the largest settlement in 
which the excess insurer would participate is $2.75M. 
 175. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 143. 
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settlements are collective. If defense-side parties could settle 
separately, lower-level insurers would no longer be structurally 
undermotivated to settle, thereby eliminating the rationale for the 
duty to contribute. And without that duty, there would be no 
cramdown mechanism to force lower-level insurers to settle for more 
than their own estimates of their expected trial liability. It follows 
that, if settlements were segmented, managers would often have to 
rely more on their corporation’s checkbook and less on insurance to 
pay for settlements of shareholder lawsuits.176 
A potential concern here is that increased indemnification would 
not in fact be available, and thus that segmented settlements would 
cause managers to bear significantly more personal liability. Except, 
however, for cases in which the corporation goes bankrupt, this would 
not be likely. Thus, in most securities class actions, indemnification by 
the corporation is readily available: such actions are typically brought 
directly against corporate managers, and state incorporation statutes 
permit indemnification for amounts paid to settle direct suits against 
corporate agents so long as there is no judicial finding that the agents 
acted in bad faith or in knowing violation of law.177 In derivative suits, 
on the other hand, corporations are statutorily barred from 
indemnifying managers for damages awards or settlement 
payments.178 Even in derivative cases, however, there is reason to 
doubt that segmented settlements would present managers with a 
significant risk of personal liability. Essentially all public corporations 
have charter provisions that immunize managers from personal 
 
 176. If the segmented approach were adopted, a question that would arise is how the 
settlement burden would be divided in cases in which a policy exclusion is likely. For example, 
in the case summarized in Table 4, the primary insurer would be willing to offer only $0.5M to 
settle its $2M liability segment. Even if the plaintiff agreed that the probability of a guilty 
verdict were only 50 percent, the plaintiff would place an expected value on this slice of the 
liability range of $1M, creating a potentially insurmountable negotiation gap. The solution 
would be for the settlement between the primary insurer and the plaintiff to include a 
stipulation that the plaintiff’s waiver of his right to collect the first $2M of any subsequent 
damages award is subject to the condition that the verdict not include a finding that would have 
triggered an exclusion. Such a condition on the waiver would close the valuation gap and make 
the separate settlement possible. In this way, segmentation would acquire a new dimension, with 
the potential liability range containing not just a series of horizontal slices based on policy limits, 
but also a vertical slice based on the probability of a policy exclusion. The vertical slice of the 
tower representing the expected value of the uninsurable damages would be the settlement 
responsibility of the defendant rather than the insurers.  
 177. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2012).  
 178. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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liability for violating the duty of care.179 Most derivative suits thus 
settle for injunctive relief, such as corporate-governance changes, 
rather than monetary damages.180 To be sure, these settlements also 
typically include an award of the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees.181 Unlike 
amounts paid in settlement, however, the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees 
can be reimbursed in derivative suits by the corporation as long as a 
judge finds that the lawsuit conferred a “substantial benefit” on the 
corporation and its shareholders.182 Therefore, if a D&O insurer were 
unwilling to settle pre-trial in a derivative suit because it thought that 
the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees were excessive, the manager-defendants 
could cause the corporation to pay to settle that insurer’s share of the 
liability burden. 
These observations suggest that the most likely consequence of 
segmented settlements is not more personal liability for managers. 
Nor, importantly, is it more litigation or trials. To the contrary, 
segmented settlements would eliminate the need for follow-on 
litigation to enforce the duties to settle and contribute. Instead, the 
primary consequence of segmented settlements would be an increase 
in the proportion of settlement money paid by corporations rather 
than by their insurers. And this result, perhaps counterintuitively, is 
one that corporate shareholders should welcome. A decrease in the 
proportion of shareholder lawsuit settlements paid by D&O insurers 
would cause premiums to fall, and so this aspect of the change should 
be essentially a wash in terms of corporate profits. But D&O 
insurance premiums would fall an additional amount to reflect the 
social benefits of segmented settlements noted previously: less 
plaintiff overcompensation, less spending on defense lawyers, and 
greater insurer specialization. And these reductions in costs would 
represent a gain to shareholders. 
In addition to generating this direct increase in overall corporate 
profits, segmented settlements would have an important corporate-
governance benefit: they would reduce managers’ ability to use D&O 
insurance to insulate corporate earnings reports from the impact of 
shareholder lawsuits. By displacing liability costs onto insurers, 
 
 179. See, e.g., DEL. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). 
 180. Erickson, supra note 48, at 1749.  
 181. Steven D. Frankel, Note, The Oracle Cases Settlement: Too Charitable to Ellison and 
the Plaintiffs’ Attorneys?, 4 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 625, 629 (2006) (pointing out that the 
“vast majority” of derivative action settlements include an award of attorneys’ fees). 
 182. E.g., Fletcher v. A.J. Indus., Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 146, 150 (Ct. App. 1968). 
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insurance weakens the link between each corporation’s reported 
earnings and the contribution of that firm’s managers to diversified 
shareholder wealth. Thus, if the managers of a particular corporation 
generate a disproportionate amount of shareholder litigation—the 
costs of which, as noted, shareholders themselves ultimately bear—
this fact is unlikely to be evident from the corporation’s reported 
earnings, as the litigation costs are shifted to the firm’s D&O 
insurers.183 
For this reason, segmented settlements would make each 
corporation’s reported financial results a more accurate measure of 
the costs to shareholders of litigation resulting from the conduct of 
that corporation’s managers. Segmented settlements therefore would 
help diversified shareholders better monitor—and, through earnings-
based compensation, better motivate—the managers of their portfolio 
firms. 
A related benefit of segmented settlements would be the 
rationalization of insurance towers. Segmenting settlements probably 
would not cause insurance towers to disappear altogether, as dividing 
coverage among insurers would still serve the valuable function of 
limiting each corporation’s exposure to the risk that a particular 
insurer will fail. But with the duty to contribute discarded as 
unnecessary, managers would no longer face an incentive to subdivide 
coverage further in order to encourage cramdown settlements. 
Instead, their incentive would be to divide coverage among insurers 
only to the extent that doing so is efficient. 
C. Reform’s First Step: Reversing the Bias of the Duty To Contribute 
This Article has argued that social welfare generally, and 
shareholder wealth specifically, would be enhanced if settlements of 
shareholder lawsuits were segmented rather than collective. If this 
 
 183. In theory, insurers could raise the premiums they charge a corporation with a history of 
submitting large insurance claims. However, as Professors Baker and Griffith describe, the 
connection between premiums and firm-specific risk is imperfect, and D&O insurance pricing 
has a cyclical nature that may tend to blur distinctions among buyers. BAKER & GRIFFITH, 
supra note 1, at 97–101. In addition, the increase in the corporation’s earnings volatility 
attributable to the rise in the premium would be much smaller than the volatility increase that 
would occur if the corporation had to pay for its shareholder-lawsuit settlements entirely by 
itself. And a volatility increase is what is most useful for corporate-governance purposes 
because it will call more investor attention to the managers’ performance and be more likely to 
reduce managerial payouts under earnings-linked compensation plans. 
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argument is correct, the practical question becomes, how can the 
segmented approach be realized? 
The prospects for reform are clouded by the fact that the current 
system for settling shareholder lawsuits reflects a state of equilibrium 
under which several politically important groups appear to benefit. 
Corporate managers benefit because collective settlements 
camouflage the costs to shareholders of lawsuits brought in response 
to the managers’ behavior. Plaintiffs’ attorneys benefit from the 
larger settlements produced by the duty to contribute. And defense 
attorneys benefit from the increased spending that results from the 
coupling of defense coverage with liability coverage. Although larger 
settlements and attorneys’ bills are paid as an initial matter by D&O 
insurers, the insurers can adjust to these higher costs by charging 
higher premiums. Thus, the costs of the system are ultimately borne 
not by the insurers but rather by public-company shareholders and, 
more broadly, by society as an implicit tax on capital formation. In 
other words, the costs of the current system are dispersed, while the 
benefits are concentrated in groups that are likely to be well 
organized and politically influential. 
The most direct way to reduce the costs of collective settlements 
in shareholder lawsuits would simply be to prohibit public companies 
from buying D&O insurance, except perhaps in the form of high-
deductible policies whose sole purpose is to keep companies out of 
bankruptcy. This change would not cause managers themselves to 
bear substantially more personal liability, as they could still be 
indemnified by their corporate employers. But the costs of 
shareholder litigation caused by the managers’ conduct would no 
longer be camouflaged, as these costs would have a direct impact on 
the corporate earnings reports that form the basis of the managers’ 
evaluations and compensation. As a practical matter, however, such 
reform seems unlikely: D&O insurance is directly authorized by 
general incorporation statutes, and state legislatures would likely find 
it politically difficult to enact amendments that almost certainly would 
be opposed by corporate executives, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and defense 
attorneys alike. 
A more promising avenue for reform may be through the courts. 
Judges probably cannot prohibit collective settlements outright, at 
least without disregarding language in commercial-liability policies 
that, as indicated in Part IV.A, seem to preclude a segmented 
approach. But judges could reinterpret the duty to contribute in a way 
that would make the current settlement regime less attractive to 
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managers. Judicial opinions on that duty have paid little attention to 
the plaintiff-overcompensation hazard created by the duty’s 
cramdown mechanism, implying that many courts are unaware that 
the hazard exists. 
A clear illustration of the judicial failure to police the plaintiff-
overcompensation hazard is the Second Circuit’s 2008 decision in 
Schwartz v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.184 The decision involved a 
securities class action against a corporate CEO who was protected by 
a multi-level insurance tower that provided $50 million in total 
coverage.185 The CEO was particularly anxious for the case to settle 
because his corporation was bankrupt and hence indemnification was 
unlikely.186 The insurers and plaintiffs were, however, unable to reach 
a settlement agreement before trial. On the day before he was to 
testify, the CEO accepted the plaintiffs’ settlement demand of $20 
million, which he paid with a personal check.187 He then sought to 
recover this amount plus interest by suing the bottom four insurers in 
the tower for bad-faith failure to settle.188 In an opinion affirming a 
jury verdict for the CEO, the Second Circuit treated the case as no 
different from those that implicate the traditional duty to settle. The 
court cited duty-to-settle cases from California, whose law governed 
the action, describing how policy limits can make insurers 
undermotivated to settle relative to their policyholders.189 No mention 
was made of the countervailing hazard, which is not implicated in the 
standard duty-to-settle case: the overeagerness of upper-level insurers 
and policyholders to settle, which can cause them to favor settling 
even when the plaintiff’s settlement demand exceeds the expected 
damages. 
Schwartz depicts the duty to contribute’s plaintiff-
overcompensation hazard in its most extreme form. By permitting a 
policyholder to negotiate a within-limit settlement and then send the 
entire bill to his insurers, the court sanctioned a settlement agreement 
in which the conflict of interests was at its zenith because the 
policyholder was negotiating entirely with the insurers’ money. In 
such a situation, the policyholder has no incentive to reject even a 
 
 184. Schwartz v. Liberty Mut. Life Ins. Co., 539 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2008).  
 185. Id. at 139. 
 186. Id.  
 187. Id. at 140. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 142.  
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settlement demand that greatly exceeds the expected damages—
which may well have been true of the $20 million figure in the case—
so long as the demand does not exceed the total coverage provided by 
the insurance tower. If Schwartz were widely followed, it almost 
certainly would destroy the market for D&O insurance, as every 
securities action that survived the motion to dismiss would 
immediately be settled by the defendants, presumably for the full 
amount of the available insurance. The resulting increase in 
premiums would make policies unmarketable. 
Fortunately, not all courts have completely neglected the conflict 
of interests inherent in the duty to contribute. For example, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court has held that one defense-side party cannot 
force others to pay for a settlement that falls entirely outside the 
party’s segment of the liability range.190 In other words, in New Jersey 
the duty to contribute can be invoked only by a party who will bear a 
portion of the settlement burden itself. This sensible rule avoids the 
extreme form of the plaintiff-overcompensation hazard that arises 
when a defense-side party is able to negotiate entirely with funds that 
others will be forced to provide. But it does not eliminate the hazard 
altogether: as the hypothetical lawsuits summarized in Tables 2 
through 4 illustrate, the duty to contribute creates an 
overcompensation hazard even when, unlike in Schwartz, the total 
settlement amount reaches the liability segment of the defense-side 
party that negotiated the settlement. 
Cases like Schwartz illustrate how courts seem to apply a 
presumption in favor of cramdown settlements, apparently reasoning 
that the willingness of an excess insurer or defendant to settle is prima 
facie evidence of the settlement’s fairness. This Article has shown 
that such reasoning is flawed. The presumption needs to be reversed: 
courts should recognize that duty-to-contribute claims present a 
plaintiff-overcompensation hazard that more traditional duty-to-
settle claims do not, and therefore that the former needs closer rather 
than laxer judicial review. If duty-to-contribute claims were harder to 
win, corporate managers would derive fewer private benefits from the 
collective approach to settlements, and they therefore would be less 
likely to resist the more efficient settlement approach described here. 
The most logical judge-made reform would be for courts simply 
to refuse to enforce the duty to contribute in cases in which the 
 
 190. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 367 A.2d 864, 870 (N.J. 1976). 
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defendants rather than the insurers run the defense. As was described 
in Part I.C, the justification for applying any type of settlement-
related duty on insurers is to protect defendants against an above-
limit damages award when the insurers could have reduced or 
eliminated the defendants’ liability by negotiating a pre-trial 
settlement. This justification necessarily presupposes that the 
defendants rely on the insurers to negotiate a settlement of the 
defendants’ own potential liability. But this presupposition is false 
when the defendants are sophisticated enough to be active in the 
negotiations and hence could negotiate a separate settlement that 
protects them from the risk of an above-limit award, regardless of 
whether their insurers remain in the case. In that situation, the duty to 
contribute serves no socially valuable purpose. The same logic also 
applies, incidentally, to the duty to settle, which similarly is difficult to 
justify in cases in which the defendants are running the defense and 
hence could protect themselves by settling separately. But the 
enforcement of that duty is less problematic given the duty’s self-
regulating nature. 
A possible objection to a judicial policy of refusing to enforce the 
duty to contribute when the defendants run the defense is that the 
duty arguably has a contractual basis, namely the standard clause in 
liability policies providing that the insurer’s consent to settlement will 
not be “unreasonably withheld.”191  But with respect to D&O policies 
in particular, courts could plausibly interpret such clauses to mean 
only that the insurer will not unreasonably refuse to settle its own 
segment of the damages range in cases in which the defendant has 
already settled out of the case. Given that an ongoing shareholder 
lawsuit can distract managers from their main job of running the 
corporation, shareholders would want D&O insurers to be under a 
minimum obligation to make good-faith efforts to settle even if 
settlements were segmented. 
In evaluating the prospects for reform, a final question is 
whether a judicial reinterpretation of the duty to contribute would 
have much of a practical impact given that D&O insurers face an 
incentive to compete for business by cultivating reputations for 
paying out on claims. As might be expected, corporate managers 
report that a D&O insurer’s “claim-paying reputation” is an 
important selection criterion (albeit less important than the insurer’s 
 
 191. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 140 (quoting a common policy form) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
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financial strength and prices).192 But at the same time, the insurers 
face a countervailing incentive to assume tough negotiating postures 
as a way of discouraging plaintiffs from suing the corporations and 
managers that they insure. In addition, Professors Baker and Griffith 
found that D&O insurers, despite their incentive to be attractive to 
corporate managers, sometimes threaten to refuse to settle as a way 
to induce corporations to contribute more to pre-trial settlements.193 
Insurers are particularly likely to push for a policyholder contribution 
when there is a strong possibility of a finding of deliberate misconduct 
at trial.194 This approach to negotiations presumably protects insurers 
from an adverse-selection problem: an insurer that became known for 
paying out even in clear cases of fraud would be most attractive to 
managers with the highest expectations of being sued. When 
settlements are collective, however, the duty to contribute constrains 
the ability of insurers to resist pre-trial settlement even in cases of 
deliberate misconduct. Segmented settlements would give insurers—
and especially primary insurers—more negotiating leverage, thereby 
shifting settlement liability onto the books of corporate defendants. 
And given that the likelihood of a coverage exclusion is positively 
correlated with the merits of the lawsuit, a decrease in net insurance 
coverage in such cases would raise the informational value to 
shareholders of corporate earnings reports and hence advance the 
deterrence goals that shareholder lawsuits are supposed to serve. 
CONCLUSION 
The current system for settling lawsuits against insured 
defendants rests on an assumption so widely accepted that it goes 
unnoticed. The assumption is that any lawsuit settlement will be a 
single agreement that collectively binds the defendant and all of its 
liability insurers. The unchallenged nature of this assumption is 
surprising in light of the costly conflict of interests it produces. The 
conflict stems from the fact that liability policies typically assign each 
insurer and the policyholder a different segment of the range of 
potential damages in a lawsuit. This combination of collective 
settlements and segmented liability means that, when a case settles 
pre-trial for the expected damages, some defense-side parties pay 
more, and others pay less, than their expected trial liability. Several 
 
 192. TOWERS WATSON, supra note 42, at 26 fig.46.  
 193. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 197. 
 194. Id. at 197. 
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legal devices have been developed to correct the disincentive to settle 
that the collective approach creates for lower-level insurers. But 
because these devices all preserve the collective approach, they 
introduce their own costly distortions. 
Among the most important of these distortions is a systematic 
plaintiff-overcompensation hazard that arises when an excess insurer 
or defendant is able to force the primary insurer, and any subsituated 
excess insurers, to contribute their policy amounts in support of a 
settlement that the excess insurer or defendant has negotiated with 
the plaintiff. Like the collective nature of settlements, this “duty to 
contribute” has gone unnoticed by commentators. Besides 
encouraging settlements that overcompensate plaintiffs, the duty to 
contribute interferes with insurer specialization and generates other 
costs that will drive up liability insurance premiums. 
If defense-side parties could settle separately their respective 
segments of the damages range, the separation between settlement 
liability and trial liability would collapse. In this way, segmented 
settlements would eliminate the conflict of interests that courts and 
commentators now treat as an unavoidable byproduct of policy limits. 
Courts could thus dispense with the duty to contribute and the more 
widely discussed duty to settle, both of which are designed to 
overcome the structural disincentive of insurers to settle when the 
potential damages exceed the insurers’ policy limits and settlements 
are collective. 
The fact that segmented settlements are not already used in 
shareholder lawsuits is difficult to attribute to judicial conservatism 
alone. Principal-agent conflict between shareholders and corporate 
managers must also bear some blame. Segmented settlements would 
increase shareholder profits by reducing or eliminating distortions 
that drive up D&O insurance premiums. But the current system 
advances managers’ interests by insulating their reputations and 
performance-based pay from the higher earnings volatility that would 
occur if the impact of shareholder lawsuit settlements were not 
deflected onto insurers. 
The private benefits to corporate managers of collective 
settlements also help explain why public companies purchase tiered 
D&O coverage from multiple insurers. Insurance towers increase the 
likelihood that a plaintiff’s settlement offer will trigger the duty to 
contribute, enabling defense-side parties on upper floors to impose a 
collective settlement that lower-floor insurers resist. This cramdown 
mechanism can produce an insured settlement even when the insurers 
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collectively believe that the plaintiff is overestimating the expected 
damages or when there is a strong chance that trial would result in a 
finding of deliberate defendant misconduct that exempts coverage. 
By dividing coverage among multiple insurers, managers can pit 
insurers against each other in a way that makes an insured settlement 
more likely, thereby camouflaging the costs of shareholder lawsuits. 
This Article has focused on D&O insurance because the 
economic benefits of segmented settlements are likely to be greatest 
in the context of shareholder litigation. But towers are not unique to 
D&O coverage. Cases involving settlement conflicts between primary 
and excess insurers have arisen in the contexts of insurance for legal 
malpractice liability,195 property damage liability,196 products liability,197 
and marine liability.198 Segmenting settlements should provide similar 
benefits in lawsuits covered by these types of liability insurance as 
well, assuming that the defendants are public corporations or their 
managers. Such cases would benefit from the segmented approach 
because they involve agents (corporate managers) who often wish to 
run their own defenses and who have a conflict of interests with their 
principals (public shareholders) that encourages overspending on 
liability coverage. The arguments advanced in this Article suggest 
that courts also should encourage segmented settlements on public-
policy grounds in this broader context, despite likely resistance from 
corporate managers. At a minimum, courts should recognize that the 
conflict of interests in negotiations to settle shareholder lawsuits is 
not inevitable. Rather, the conflict most likely persists because it 
favors the interests of attorneys and corporate managers, even while a 
more efficient approach is available. 
 
 195. E.g., Fireman’s Fund, 367 A.2d at 866. 
 196. E.g., Me. Bonding & Cas. Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 693 P.2d 1296, 1298 (Or. 1985). 
 197. See e.g., Syverud, supra note 43, at 1194–95 (describing coverage purchased by the 
manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device). 
 198. E.g., Keystone Shipping Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 840 F.2d 181, 183 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(involving a shipping company that had purchased six layers of marine-liability coverage). 
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Appendix 
This Appendix presents in general terms the various settlement-
negotiation scenarios that the Article has illustrated through 
numerical examples. A few simplifying assumptions are retained: that 
the time value of money is zero, the parties are risk-neutral, the trial 
outcomes are dichotomous, and the defendant has sufficient wealth to 
pay any damages award. Another assumption, later relaxed, is that 
the parties have common estimates of the potential damages. 
 
Terms are defined as follows: 
 
D potential damages 
p probability (between 0 and 1, exclusive) of a verdict for 
the plaintiff 
kP plaintiff’s trial costs 
kD defense’s trial costs 
L policy limit 
S total pre-trial settlement amount 
SI settlement amount paid by the liability insurer 
SD settlement amount paid by the insured defendant 
T transfer captured by the duty to contribute 
 
1.  No insurance 
Considered first is a lawsuit against a defendant without 
insurance. The plaintiff will be willing to settle pre-trial for no less 
than pD - kP, and the defendant will be willing to settle for no more 
than pD + kD, making the following true: 
 
(3)199 pD - kP < S < pD + kD 
 
 
199
 Numbering is continuous with that begun with the two equations in Part II.A. 
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The width of the range of possible settlements is kP + kD, which is the 
surplus from settling. 
2.  Collective settlements without settlement duties 
Next is considered a scenario in which the defendant has liability 
insurance, settlements are collective, and there are no settlement 
duties. As is typical with D&O insurance, the assumption throughout 
is that the insurer provides both liability coverage and defense 
coverage and that both are subject to the same policy limit. In this 
and subsequent scenarios involving collective settlements, two further 
assumptions are necessary in order that the insurer has a conflict of 
interests with the defendant. First, it is assumed that L < D + kD, 
meaning that the policy limit is less than the potential damages plus 
the defense’s trial costs, and hence that the defendant faces potential 
trial liability. Second, it is assumed that kD < L, meaning that the 
defense’s trial costs are less than the policy limit. Without this second 
assumption, the insurer would be liable for its full policy amount 
regardless of what happened at trial, and therefore it would not be 
undermotivated to settle. 
On these assumptions, the insurer’s expected trial liability is 
pL + (1 - p)kD, meaning that the insurer expects to pay its policy limit 
when the plaintiff prevails at trial, and to pay the defense costs when 
the defendant prevails. In negotiations between the plaintiff and the 
insurer, the settlement amount is as follows: 
 
(4) If p(L - D) +(1 - p)kD + kP < 0, then SI = Ø 
 
(5) If p(L - D) + (1 - p)kD + kP > 0,  
then pD - kP < SI < pL + (1 - p)kD 
 
A possibility exists that a settlement will not be reached between the 
plaintiff and insurer, which will occur if the potential damages (D) are 
too large relative to the policy limit (L). Whereas the width of the 
settlement range was previously kD + kP, it is now p(L - D) + (1 -  p)kD 
+ kP. This second amount could be negative, precluding settlement. 
In this and all subsequent scenarios involving negotiations with 
the defendant, the defendant could be replaced with an excess 
insurer, and the same results would apply assuming that the damages 
plus the defense’s trial expenses do not exceed the excess limit. 
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3.  Segmented settlements 
If instead the segmented settlements approach were used, two 
different negotiations would occur, one between the insurer and the 
plaintiff, and the other between the defendant and the plaintiff. As 
suggested in Part III.A, the assumption will be that when one 
defense-side party settles, the other is responsible for the full defense 
costs of trial. Therefore, the maximum amount that each defense-side 
party will be willing to pay to settle equals the defense’s trial costs 
plus the expected value of the party’s segment of the damages range. 
Because the plaintiff needs to settle with both defense-side parties to 
avoid trial, he will be willing to accept from each defense-side party 
that party’s potential damages liability minus the plaintiff’s full trial 
costs. The following inequalities are thus true: 
 
(6) pL - kP < SI < pL + kD 
 
(7) p(D - L) – kP < SD <  p(D - L) + pkD 
 
Both inequalities have a solution for all possible values of the 
variables; thus, unlike in the collective settlements scenario without 
settlement duties, there is no possibility of trial. The total settlement 
amount, equal to SI + SD, is given as follows: 
 
(8) pD - 2kP < S <  pD + 2kD 
 
The width of the possible settlements range is 2kP + 2kD, which is 
wider than that given in inequality (3) by the amounts of the trial 
costs on both sides. The widening is symmetrical around the expected 
damages, indicating no systematic bias toward plaintiff 
overcompensation or undercompensation relative to the scenario 
without insurance. 
4.  Collective settlements with the duty to settle 
The next scenario returns returns to the collective settlements 
approach, except that settlement duties now apply, and an additional 
assumption is made that pD < L. Based on this assumption, the case is 
considered where the plaintiff makes a settlement offer within the 
policy limit, triggering the duty to settle. Assuming a court would 
consider this offer reasonable, the range of potential settlements is 
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the same as that given by inequality (3), above. Thus, when the 
expected damages are less than the policy limit, under the collective 
settlements approach the duty to settle achieves a negotiated 
settlement without biasing the negotiations toward plaintiff 
overcompensation or undercompensation relative to the case without 
insurance. 
5.  Collective settlements with the duty to contribute 
The alternative scenario with collective settlements and 
settlement duties arises when pD > L, meaning that the expected 
damages are greater than the policy limit. Based on this assumption, 
the case is considered in which the plaintiff makes an above-limit 
settlement offer, implicating the duty to contribute. As long as a court 
deems the settlement amount reasonable, the defendant can settle for 
an amount above L and then use the duty to recover L from the 
insurer. The range of possible settlements in negotiations between the 
defendant and the plaintiff becomes: 
 
(9) pD - kP < SD < L + p(D - L) + pkD 
 
This inequality has a solution for all possible values of the variables, 
assuring settlement. 
As noted, the insurer contributes L to this settlement, whereas 
the maximum it would pay without the duty to contribute—equal to 
its expected trial liability—is pL + (1 - p)kD, as shown in inequality 
(6). The difference between the two is the transfer captured by the 
duty to contribute, which as discussed in Part II.A is the amount of 
potential plaintiff overcompensation: 
 
(10) T = (1 - p)L – (1 - p)kD 
 
Notably, the amount of the transfer also equals the difference 
between the maximum amount the defendant is willing to pay as 
expressed in inequality (9), where she has insurance, and the 
maximum amount she is willing to pay in inequality (3), where she 
lacks insurance. In other words, the duty to contribute has widened 
the potential settlement range by T. And it has done so 
asymmetrically, increasing the defendant’s willingness to pay by the 
amount of the transfer without lowering the minimum amount the 
plaintiff is willing to accept. 
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The transfer as represented in equation (10) is smaller than that 
given by equation (1) in Part II.A, which ignores trial costs. The 
difference is (1 - p)kD, which reflects the insurer’s expected share of 
the trial costs, and which is avoided in case of settlement. The transfer 
will always be positive given the assumption noted earlier that kD < L. 
The adjustment for trial costs does not change the two 
observations about the plaintiff-overcompensation hazard 
emphasized in Part II.A: that the size of the transfer (and hence the 
potential amount of plaintiff overcompensation) rises as the 
probability of a verdict for the plaintiff falls; and, in an insurance 
tower, that the size of the transfer increases with the number of 
policies. This second observation remains true because, as described 
in Part II.A, an increase in the number of policies raises L, which in 
the multi-insurer setting represents the policy limit nearest D without 
exceeding it. In addition, because the defense trial costs (kD) are 
unlikely to increase linearly with the potential damages (D),200 
whereas in a tower the policy limit closest to the potential damages 
from below (L) will increase linearly (albeit discontinuously) with the 
potential damages, the size of the transfer as expressed in equation 
(10) increases with the potential damages. 
6.  Duty to contribute with plaintiff or insurer overconfidence 
This Article argued in Part IV.B.1 that the duty to contribute can 
help achieve a covered settlement when the plaintiff places a higher 
value on his case than the defense-side parties do. This argument can 
be shown here by defining two additional variables: p1 and p2, the 
plaintiff’s and the defense-side parties’ respective estimates of the 
probability of a verdict for the plaintiff if trial occurs. The assumption 
will be that p1 > p2, creating the type of disagreement that can cause 
negotiations to break down. 
We will consider first the case in which the defendant has just 
one insurer. For this case, the assumption will be that D + kD < L, 
meaning the full potential costs of trial to the defense-side parties 
would be covered by the insurer. In negotiations between the insurer 
and the plaintiff, the settlement amount is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
200
 See supra Part I.B. 
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(11) If (p2 - p1)D + kD + kP < 0, then SI = Ø 
 
(12) If (p2 - p1)D + kD + kP > 0, then p1D - kP < SI < p2D + kD 
 
The difference between the plaintiff’s and the defense-side parties’ 
estimates of the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff has created 
the risk that the plaintiff and the insurer will fail to reach a 
settlement, leaving the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s settlement 
demand if she wishes to avoid trial. 
To reduce the risk that she will be faced with a choice between 
paying for a settlement herself and going to trial, the defendant can 
divide coverage between two insurers, creating the possibility that 
one will use the duty to contribute to cram down a settlement on the 
other. To express this in general terms, we will assume that defendant 
acquires a primary policy with limit LI and an excess policy with an 
attachment point of LI and a limit of LII. Consistent with previous 
scenarios, the assumption is that  kD < LI. The duty to contribute is 
implicated if the plaintiff makes a settlement demand that equals at 
least his estimate of the expected damages, assuming that LI < p1D 
and that any settlement amount reached by the parties would be 
considered reasonable by a court. A further simplifying assumption 
will be that D + kD < LII. This last assumption excludes the defendant 
from settlement negotiations, limiting the negotiations to the plaintiff 
and the insurers. Now the range of possible settlements between the 
plaintiff and the excess insurer, expressed as SII, is as follows: 
 
(13) If (1 - p2)LI + (p2 – p1)D + p2kD + kP < 0, then SII = Ø 
 
(14) If (1 - p2)LI + (p2 - p1)D + p2kD + kP > 0, 
 then p1D - kP < SII < LI + p2(D - LI) + p2kD 
 
Comparing the condition on inequality (14) to that on inequality 
(12) shows the change in the range of potential values for which a 
settlement can be reached. This comparison shows that the settlement 
range has been widened by (1 - p2)LI – (1 - p2)kD. Comparing this 
difference to equation (10) indicates that this is the wealth transfer 
from the primary insurer produced by the duty to contribute as 
calculated by the defense-side parties—that is, based on their 
estimate of the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff. Since their 
estimate of this value is lower, the transfer is larger than it would be if 
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based on the plaintiff’s estimate. Thus, the duty to contribute has 
increased the range of settlement demands that will produce an 
insurance-covered settlement by the amount of the wealth transfer 
away from the primary insurer. 
7.  Duty to contribute with a possible coverage exclusion 
Part IV.B.2 explained that the duty to contribute can also 
increase the likelihood of a covered settlement when there is a 
possibility that trial will produce a finding of deliberate defendant 
misconduct that triggers an insurance coverage exclusion. This 
possibility can be represented by defining a new term, e, as the 
probability that, if the trial verdict is for the plaintiff, the verdict 
includes a finding that excludes coverage. By assumption the value of 
e is known to all parties. To isolate the effect of this new factor, we 
also will resort to the previous assumption that all parties have a 
common estimate of the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff, again 
represented by p. 
As in the previous scenario, the first case considered is where the 
defendant has just one insurance policy and D + kD < L. In 
negotiations between the insurer and plaintiff, the settlement amount 
is as follows: 
 
(15) If (1 – ep)kD + kP – epD < 0, then SI = Ø 
 
(16) If (1 – ep)kD + kP – epD > 0,  
 then pD - kP < SI < (1 – e)pD + (1 – ep)kD 
 
As is intuitive, the risk of a failed negotiation, given by equation (15), 
rises with e, the probability of a coverage exclusion. 
As in the last scenario, the alternative case occurs when the 
defendant has acquired both a primary policy with limit LI and an 
excess policy with an attachment point of LI and a limit of LII. Once 
again the assumptions are that kD < LI and D + kD < LII. The duty to 
contribute is implicated if the plaintiff makes a settlement offer 
equaling at least the expected damages and LI < pD. Assuming again 
that a court would consider reasonable any settlement reached by the 
parties, the range of possible settlements between the plaintiff and 
the excess insurer, expressed again as SII, is as follows: 
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(17) If (1 – p)LI - ep(D - LI) + (1 – e)pkD + kP < 0, then SII = Ø 
 
(18) If (1 – p)LI - ep(D - LI) + (1 – e)pkD + kP > 0, 
 then pD - kP < SII < LI + (1 – e)p(D - LI) +(1 – e)pkD 
 
Comparing the condition on inequality (18) to that on inequality (16) 
gives the change in the range of potential values for which a 
settlement can be reached. That comparison shows that the range has 
widened by (1 - p)LI + epLI - (1 - p)kD. This is the wealth transfer from 
the primary insurer produced by the duty to contribute in this case. 
The transfer is larger than that calculated in equation (10) by epLI, 
reflecting the capture by the cramdown settlement of the reduction in 
the primary insurer’s expected trial liability caused by the possibility 
of a coverage exclusion. Thus, the duty to contribute has increased 
the range of settlement demands that will produce an insurance-
covered settlement by the amount of the wealth transfer that the duty 
captures. 
 
